Answer to Majid Nawaz- CRITIQUE OF "EVALUATING HIZBUT-TAHRIR'S THEO-POLITICAL STANCE"

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim

1. Introduction

The Muslim world is in a state of political flux, with decades of mismanagement, repression and political stagnation being opposed by more assertive populations and political movements. The US has responded to these changes by calling for greater freedom and democratic reforms. These calls, along with the failed military interventions, have catalysed the unprecedented vocalisation for the implementation of the Sharia, unification of the Muslim lands and resistance to western cultural, military and political hegemony in the Muslim world, encapsulated in the call for the Caliphate[1]. The vanguard of change is led by the Islamicists, from Morocco to Indonesia, emboldened by an ideological interpretation of the Islamic faith by a leading number of twentieth century thinkers and writers [2]. Increasingly at the forefront of these movements is Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an international Islamic political party, with its call for a world-wide Caliphate.

Attempts by Western governments at containment and oppression have failed to date leading to considerations of engagement with the Islamists, always however on one premise, as stated by the former British Home Minister Charles Clarke in 2005, “…there can be no negotiation about the re-creation of the Caliphate; there can be no negotiation about the imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law”[3]. The focus on engagement is now focusing on the refutation of Islamist ideas in an attempt to diffuse the increasingly vehement calls for change.

The UK has seen an increase in Islamic activism over recent years, fuelled by unethical government foreign policy. The government has responded with a number of initiatives to combat this providing funding for the training of local leaders (imams, chaplains etc), Islamic websites, road shows and informers. Terrorism legislation has been introduced reducing civil rights and introducing heavy sentences for those “advocating” or “glorifying” terrorism[4]. Collaboration has begun in earnest with academics, scholars and ex-Islamists through engagement and refutation of Islamic political ideas[5]. The interest in ex-members of these movements, including Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher and Hassan Butt[6], especially by the intelligence community, provides the context and background for this critique.

Maajid Nawaz, an ex-member of HT, recently announced his resignation of the party and following his predecessors, has began publicly challenging the ideas of HT, with the first of his series of announced articles comprising “Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir's Theo-Political Stance”[7]. This paper is a detailed critique and response to these challenges.

2. What is the Argument?

Maajid introduces his article by saying, “I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis, ...merely to serve narrow political agendas”, a theme that is and remains central to his new enterprise.

His article continues to argue that HT through a "political ijtihad" creates a theory whereby non-decisive definitions of the terms Dar al-Kufr (lands of non-Islam) are adopted and applied to the current Muslim lands, to “advocate the theological illegitimacy of contemporary Muslim regimes”[8]. The argument then proceeds to demand the current systems/regimes need to be transformed into the Caliphate (Islamic system of governance) and forcefully merged into a unitary state through HT’s Islamic methodology. Maajid contends there is a difference of opinion (ijtihad) on these definitions amongst classical jurists, and as such, HT cannot (Islamically) enforce its view on anyone else and must obey the current rulers whose view is final on the matter due to them being legitimate. He says, "If it can be demonstrated that the Party’s theory is nothing but a legal opinion (Ijtihâd), then the argument that opposing views are based on Kufr becomes unsustainable."[9]

He further states he will demonstrate how the party's own theological, intellectual and legal principles when applied to their "political conclusions" result in the invalidity of the HT stance. He maintains HT even acknowledges these are contested ideas but at the same time rejects the alternative views and acts as if the position is definitive. As such, in his view, HT’s position is contradictory and invalid.

His article centres on proving the following three points:

· The non-scriptural and contested nature of the technical terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam

· The indecisive nature of scriptural citations used to arrive at them

· The acknowledgement in a HT book that the scholars differed in their views as to how Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr

3. Issues with the Argument

There are a number of problems with Maajid’s article. These are summarised below and addressed in this paper:

a) Assuming an Islamic counter-reformation and political reformation are mutually exclusive

b) Assuming usage of indecisive technical terminology cannot be used to describe decisive concepts

c) Believing decisive concepts (implementation of the Islamic creed in political life) are contested

d) Misquoting and misrepresenting the classical scholars

e) Misrepresentation of HT’s adoptions and analysis

f) Concealment of an underlying political agenda

4. The Modern Muslim World - Dar al-Islam (Lands of Islam)?

Maajid’s crusade against HT in particular, and Islamists in general, is premised on the fact that HT has somehow politicised Islam; HT misunderstands the governance of the Muslim world (which happens to be Islamic, similar to the Caliphates of the past) and through its call for a Caliphate is causing and the cause of the West’s antagonism towards Islam. Furthermore he believes that a counter-reformation and political reformation are mutually exclusive with the latter being unneccessary. He states, “I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis”.

For an ex-member of a political party, he presents an unusually simplistic understanding of the complex causes of decline and flux in the Muslim world, its historic relationship with the West (colonial Europe) and the current crisis it faces. Jean-François Mayer, in his earlier cited paper, states, “Reading Hizb ut-Tahrir's literature could indeed fuel resentment against the West, since the latter is constantly presented as oppressing the Muslim world and conspiring against it. One should add that here Hizb ut-Tahrir only builds on feelings that are already widespread in Muslim communities (including communities established in the West)”[10].

How did these feelings and the politicisation of Islam become so entrenched in Muslims globally? The answer to this lies in the experiences of the Muslim world during the European colonialist period, eventually becoming institutionalised at all levels. This is a vast subject beyond the scope of a paper such as this. However an overview highlighting some of the exogenous influences on the politics, society and governance of the Muslim world should demonstrate this. Furthermore it will highlight the error in assuming the Muslim world continues in its historical pre-colonial trajectory and that HT and present day Islamists are politicizing Islam for their new political ends.

Background

Colonialism had a major role and influence in shaping the institutional foundations and parameters of the politics of the postcolonial states. Having ruthlessly replaced centuries old institutions, traditions and structures in the Muslim world, the colonising powers disrupted a historic continuum creating fault lines and tensions that reverberate today. Independence ended the sovereignty of European powers over their territories; however it did not produce states afresh. Despite the rhetoric of planting of new seeds, the new states were nothing more than new branches based on a trunk that was planted during the colonial days.

Colonial institutions, policies and attitudes towards governance determined the trajectory of the post-colonial nation states, developing in the European intellectual, legal and cultural legacy. The machinery of the colonial state was inherited and to varying degrees the model of the colonial state was followed with ideological continuities easily visible despite the rhetoric of the new leaders. The preponderance of colonial power ensured that all discourse be both hegemonic over and repressive of the Islamic world. It was not a dialogue between equals nor a conversation, but an attempt to reconstitute Islam and Muslims both at the level of consciousness and at the social level. The impact of this historical experience is not difficult to discern and has been highlighted by numerous researchers.

Nation States

The colonization of Muslim lands started with India, the scramble for Africa and the division of Ottoman lands following the First World War. The era ended after the Second World War when Britain and France withdrew from most of their territories. Islam received harsh criticism from the colonialists and their scholars instilling a sense of inferiority in the local elites and rising bureaucrats including even those who opposed colonialism.

Colonial territories made little effort to unify their peoples to create national societies or national cultures. Their focus was in defending their territories against other colonial powers or reducing the burden of ruling. The former led them to promoting the sanctity of their boundaries which led to the permanent borders and divisions visible today. The latter prevented the creation of lasting identities seen in the diverseness and tensions in states including Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia and Nigeria.

The deliberate manipulation of diversities to strengthen their rule created increasingly fractured societies. Along with poorly thought out border definitions meant that tensions and wars were inevitable. Civil wars in Sudan, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Chad are but a few. Territorial disputes involved: Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon Palestine, Malaysia and Singapore.

Education

The colonizers encouraged and invested in education and educational institutions to educate those who would eventually run the machinery of state. Over time they influenced generations of Muslim leaders and intellectual developments in the Muslim lands. Famous institutions included University of Punjab, University of Malaya, and Atchison College in Lahore[11]. Many sons of the elite were sent to schools in Eton Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge in England or in Paris and Amsterdam. Muhammad Iqbal studied at Cambridge and Heidelberg Universities as well as Lincoln’s Inn where Jinnah received his law degree. Many of the North African liberation movement leaders were students in North African French schools and Paris Universities.

Amongst the militaries officers would be trained at places such as Sandhurst and Saint Cyr or officer schools modelled on their European counter parts such as Quetta Staff College in Pakistan.

The pervasive impact of education introduced the Muslim world to western literature and philosophy. Figures such as J S Mill and Rousseau and over time, Sartre and Camus, became models for dissenting intellectuals just as Lenin, Castro, Mao and Che Guevara captured the imagination of activists [12].

State Institutions

The colonialists generally focused on domination to ensure legitimacy and security. Institutions were devised to organize relations between the state and society and the paradigm that governs politics, maintained in the workings of successor states. The colonial state was highly centralised utilising institutions with a European flavour; the police, judiciary, military and bureaucracy being key repositories of its authority. The institutions were not designed for society – for instance, the bureaucracy was designed not to maintain order but to ensure the smooth running of government and economy.

This structure allowed a European minority to rule vast territories, managing the economic flow of resources and goods between the parent state and its territories. These institutions, embedded in subsequent states determined the basis of the state, its character and its relationship with society and other states. States such as Pakistan replicated the colonial state in set up and function as well as how they envision their own roles, with Jinnah the first governor-general and the India Act of 1935 being law of the land until 1956. In Turkey, the law was secularized based on the Napoleonic Code, the Muslim calender abandoned, the script latinized, polygamy prohibited and in 1928 the constitution was even amended to remove the statement that Turkey was an Islamic state.

Military and Police Forces

The military, intelligence and police forces were trained to provide support to their colonial masters. The training ensured soldiers, and more importantly the officer corp., internalized the military ideas and political values of the colonial administration, resulting in an over-preoccupation with order and impatience with politics of the masses[13]. Militaries were trained not for external war but for preservation of internal order, giving them a perceived right to interfere in politics to restore order. The size of the militaries was usually based on the interests of the colonisers and Muslim states inherited omnipotent militaries, too large for their population sizes and economic strengths. The colonial policy of recruiting amongst minorities was due to them being more closely allied with the colonial order and their willingness to help suppress the dominant community as well as being less likely to respond to religious calls like Jihad. The legacy of the Great Mutiny of 1857 shaped thinking resulting in Alawis dominating the Syrian army and Punjabis the Pakistani army.

The forces having fought with their senior colonial officers up to independence developed and institutionalised attitudes of mistrust and cynicism of those who fought for independence. Indonesian generals remained wary of Sukarno, removing him when they were provided with the pretext of Communism and the same may be said of those who lead coups in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Sudan. Even the left-leaning junior officers who overthrew their senior officers of the old school to join the anti-imperialist struggles did not resolve the tensions between military and civilian orders, leading to military takeovers in Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

The pervasive nature of the intelligence services (mukhabaraat) is wideley felt throughout the Arab world, stifling discussion, controlling political movements and quashing critcism. It needs little comment as the experiences of those who have had the ill-fate of experiencing this institution are wideley known and reported. Unprecedented in Muslim history is the restructuring and organisation of "official" scholars, compromising the independance the Muslim Jurists have had since the early centuries of Islam, "scholars for dollars" being a phrase often heard in relation to this new breed. Across the Islamic world Muslims are found referring to texts dating back centuries, if not over a millenium, mistrusting the views of these figures.

Bureaucracy

Like the military, the bureaucracy was moulded in the ethos of colonial culture, sharing the same political outlook as their European rulers. Due to their power over the state machinery, politicians would have little control over them lest they disrupt the workings of state. As such, they had major input into state formation, ensuring continuities in the ethos and mode of operation of the state before and after independence. In Pakistan the bureaucracy eclipsed the political elite in managing the country, replacing Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan after 1951 by senior bureaucrats Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza, both having risen through the bureaucracy under the British.

The quality of the bureaucracy was generally determined by the investment the colonial power made in its administration, the Indian Civil Service being exemplary, whilst the bureaucracies of the Arab Near East and Libya being underdeveloped. Over time, many lost their independence and their pre-eminence declined resulting in the diminishment of their political role and contribution to socioeconomic change.

Judiciary

The British colonies generally had a system of justice modelled after that of Britain, with some degree of autonomy, its independence from the executive branch becoming embedded in the structure of the postcolonial state. As such, colonial subjects usually had a strong degree of respect for it. In Pakistan, the judiciary has regularly defied the executive branch; with examples including opposition to Ayub Khan’s banning of Jamaati Islam in 1964, ruling against Ghulam Khan’s dismissing of the government in 1993 and most recently the stand-off against Musharraf. The Malaysian judiciary has a similar history[14] as do most post-colonial British territories.

The judiciary had the interesting effect of instituting particular patterns of political activity in the body politic of the pre and post-colonial society, allowing courts to become avenues for political activism.

Governance - Politics of Identity

Colonial rule was often only possible through the manipulation of divisions in society, ethnic, linguistic and religious [15]. By accentuating social differences, they institutionalised them; treating communities differently in the eyes of the law, at polling booths, in how resources were allocated and in recognition of religious rights etc. This encouraged the politics of identity at the cost of development of uniform civil societies. In India, this resulted in the emergence of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 that lobbied for separate electorates for Muslims and Hindus with similar reactions in Malaysia, Nigeria and Palestine.

In essence elections in colonial rule provided a critical political framework that shaped the conception of communities of their relation to power at the centre as well as their own identity and self-definition. The subsequent state leaders (usually from the colonial military or bureaucracy), would continue manipulating social divisions even as they spoke of national unity - Iraq being a case in question.

The importance of certain geographic locations to colonising powers (e.g., North West India to the British for supply of troops) or where the colonisers arrived late (e.g., the French agricultural relationships with Syria) meant that they developed patronage networks, which have left indelible marks in future state-society relationships. The state emerged as paternalistic and society came to see patronage as a function of state (this contributed to Malays remaining aloof from commercial activities expecting the state to guarantee economic and social standing).

Authority

Though the aim and general structure of colonial authority was usually similar, variations of how the colonial administrators ruled their vassal populations accounted for the different experiences in state formations post-colonialism. In Algeria and Libya colonial rule was direct while in Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia, Java and India local elites were used. The Dutch in Java, utilised the local elites to resolve labour shortages, entrenching their socio-political positions, creating dependencies between the peasantry and elite (the Dutch permitting exploitation and impoverishment for their own ends). The British carefully controlled 250 princes in India to control a third of the Indian population – they controlled the rest of the population by manipulating landowners, local chiefs and grandees[16].

Symbiotic relationships resulted, entrenching the positions of these local elites, who favoured compartmentalisation of policy in favour of a uniform national political arena. This allowed them to control segments of the polity and negotiate with the centre. In Pakistan this trend is still visible today with the landowning class wielding significant power, controlling politics at all levels, and resisting land reforms. The power of the monarchy in the Gulf States and Brunei and the characteristics of tribal chiefs in East Africa and Nigeria is reflective of these British policies. The Algerian experience with direct French rule to ensure integration into France and exploitation through commercial gain for their settlers resulted in centralised rule – local elites and leaders were seen with hostility, a reflection of the post-colonial Algerian landscape.[17]

Conclusions

Its structural expressions in the Islamic environment continue to reproduce themselves in a fashion that perpetuates this power relationship. Elites in most Islamic countries are largely products of superimposed constitutive educational and political structures. In this lies the essence of the polarization and bifurcation between elites and masses in the Muslim world. Muslim and Arab intellectuals, imbued with the Western discourse of rationality, entered political life as natural allies to the local traditional elites and the colonial West. The broad mass base, on the other hand, had no choice but to fall back upon the traditional values of their own society to protect themselves from the excesses of the new class - a class which sought and seeks to pattern its life and values along Western lines. Commitment to traditional (Islamic) values thus reflects a defensive posture aimed at rejuvenating the spirit of internal cohesion and self-identification against the disintegrative effects brought in by patterns of modern life.

In the absence of social cohesion, it becomes almost impossible for the State to deal adequately with strains, penetrate society, regulate social relationships and extract resources. In the absence of an overarching consciousness that unites and merges its subjects at all levels of the social scale in a commonly accepted meaning and criteria of validity, there can be neither strong societies nor strong states.

HT go to some lengths to detail the reality of the colonial division of the Ottoman state, introduction of foreign creeds, the installation of agents and groomed elites, and the removal of Islam from politics and societal life leaving at best remnants intact (usually to pacify the masses/ullema), with control over succession of power to those who would perpetuate their interests and hegemony. The institutionalization of secularism and the proactive marginalization of Islamic thoughts/institutions from political life have been resisted by societies in each and every Muslim country[18]. A review of scholarly writings that address the 20th century colonialist experience across the Muslim world and the response of the Muslim intellectuals speak for themselves and need no elaboration as per Abdul Qadeem Zalloom's quote Maajid refers to.

Against this complex, multi-dimensional, historically evolving reality, Maajid’s analysis is little more than a parochial one-dimensional view of the situation. His view the current regimes as being simply "Muslims" does not take into consideration the institutionalized colonial values, foreign ideologies, systems, agendas and outlooks, visible today across the organs of the modern states, their constitutions, policies, administration and organizations along with the resulting tensions. As such, his conclusions are fundamentally flawed.

5. Decisive Texts are Indecisive?

HT’s discourse is concerned with the implementation of non-Islamic systems across the Muslim world since the division of the Ottoman state by colonial powers, a situation unparalleled in Muslim history. This situation is sensed and understood by all Muslims, thinkers, politicians, movements and the masses – as such it is a decisive and categorical reality which HT term as non-Islamic (kufr), and one that is acknowledged by all as needing change.

To understand HT’s argument, that the implementation of non-Islamic creeds in Muslim lands is decisively and categorically prohibited and utilisation of any other ideology or system is kufr (non-Islamic), the notion of certainty must first be addressed as this appears a confused premise embedded in his article.

There are a number of discussions in philosophy that attempt to argue a relativist position on matters of epistemology [19]. Although the oft-quoted view in Western Philosophy is that the quest for certainty is a failed enterprise, this is primarily due to an erroneous attempt at defining certainty to unnecessarily exclude skepticism [20]. However, without this requirement, the term is definable and arguable. Certainty comprises the state of an individual (or a society) on a matter where there is no realistic doubt. This is supported by the usage of this term (yaqin) by Allah (swt) in a number of verses[21] supporting the existence and necessity of the notion of certainty[22].

Maajid has a flawed assumption in his understanding upon which his entire reasoning is built - namely, if some people (or scholars) disagree on a matter it is zanni (indecisive) and by implication if there is no dispute the matter is qati (decisive). Thus he should believe prior to historical ikhtilaf (dispute) on matters of jurisprudence, all matters were qati as no dispute existed. Likewise, he should believe that the Quran is zanni as there are scholars who dispute parts of it and even what constitutes something being mutawatir. This understanding of his is obviously wrong.

Certainty can be gained and expressed despite the existence of people disputing an issue, as in cases of religious certainty that exists in matters of faith. As disagreement exists on every matter, even those that all Muslims would acknowledge as definite and decisive, (existence of God, Quran being the word of God, Islam being the truth (haqq), obligation of prayer (salat) etc ) would that mean there is no such thing as certainty?

The existence of a disagreement is not important and does not mean the matter is certain or uncertain - the substance of the disagreement must be evaluated to determine if it is a valid disagreement. In scriptural analysis, if there is propensity for an alternative view or consideration, the matter is not deemed to be certain - if however there is no possibility of an alternative consideration, the matter is deemed certain. An obvious point, but one which regularly is violated by Maajid's analysis is that new concepts need to coexist with existing concepts that have been accepted (verified) so there are no discrepencies or anomalies between them. If one puts a criteria of certainty down, one should not just evaluate one's dispute with someone using that criteria - it should be consistent with the one's other ideas - throughout this paper examples will be used to demonstrate this issue.

This understanding is acknowledged by HT as per Maajid’s quotation from “Shaksiyyah Islamiyya" (The Islamic Personality) in relation to shubhat al-daleel (semblance of evidence) for determining the validity of an alternative view. However the associated conditions are as follows, without which there is no shubhat al-daleel[23]:

a) Definite general evidences comprise Quran, Sunnah, Ijma al-Sahabah and Qiyas.

b) Speculative general evidences include: istihsan (juristic preference), al-masalih al mursala (unqualified interests) etc.

c) The angle of deductive reasoning (istidlal) regarding these evidences must have been on studies of the Arabic language and studies of sections of the Quran and Sunnah.

For example, to demonstrate how this would apply in practice, a Quranic verse states: “Cut the hand of the thief, male or female”[24]. It may be said the cutting is to prevent him from stealing and this may be done through any means, e.g., imprisonment, exhortation etc. Or it may be said the word “qata’a” (to cut) is an ambivalent term (lafz al-mujmal) meaning either separating the limb (amputation) or scarring and both cases are allowed. However, neither view has a shubhat al-daleel. This is because the deductive reasoning in this manner does not accord with the Arabic language or other divine texts. Linguistically, one does not use the metaphorical meaning (majazi) except when the real meaning is not possible. The ambivalent meaning has been transformed into a fixed meaning by the explanation of texts and one does not refer to a meaning contradicting it. Abu Hurairah (ra) narrated a thief who had stolen a turban was brought to the Messenger who ordered his hand be cut and the wound be sealed by boiling oil. Subsequent Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, followed this understanding without any objection from any of the companions. Punishing the thief with anything other than cutting of the hand has no evidence or semblance of evidence[25].

Furthermore, shubhat daleel does not mean one does not follow in action the opinion one has come to. Respect for shubhat daleel in terms of recognising it as an Islamic opinion is a general and traditional principle[26]. As for respect in actions, this is an ikhtilafi (disputed) matter and depends on the particular hukm (rule) at hand. In some issues one does not impose one’s opinion and in others one does. Therefore to state shubhat daleel means respect in all actions is a misrepresentation of HT’s and the traditional understanding of shubhat daleel.

To demonstrate and clarify this, a spectrum of fiqh examples are given below:

a) If someone abandons prayer he is a Kafir according to Hanbalis but a sinful Muslim for the rest. Everyone respects this opinion but in action one would pray behind this man and consider giving a daughter in marriage to him, but the Hanbali would not as for him he is kafir. So the different views of the depiction of a reality command respect as Islamic opinions but not necessarily respect in actions such one abandons an opinion and follows the other opinion.

b) If a Shafii combines his salah (prayer), the Hanafi would respect this as an Islamic opinion but not follow him in his action.

c) If a man pronounces divorce three times in one sitting and he follows that it is irrevocable, it does not matter what opinion the woman follows. The opinion of the woman that 3 in one sitting is not valid does not mean respect of her opinion.

d) If a ruler usurps authority and he follows that this is allowed. People who follow the opinion that mutasallit has to be removed are entitled to fight even though the ruler follows a different opinion. For example those who historically fought Yazid and Hajjaj bin Yusuf.

e) If a wali (governor) declares himself Khalifah and says he has shubhat daleel, the real Khalifah should still fight him and bring him under his authority.

The pronouncement of kufr on views (takfeer) is something that is rarely used or evoked (historically it was pronounced on some wayward philosophers in one of its rare applications in over a thousand years of Islamic history) and is not relevant to the discussion. Islam encourages the notions of inquiry rather than limit them. HT is not in the business of pronouncing takfeer. It does not state alternative views are kufr regardless of how weak they are so long they are built on the Islamic creed - rather, it believes kufr creeds are still being used as reference points since the colonialists left the Muslim lands, a matter that is prohibited categorically.

The argument Maajid uses that “Amr imam yarfa ul-khilaf” (the imam resolves the disputes) assumes that the ruler is legitimate and adopts according to Islam. The society should then follow what the ruler has adopted since he resolves the disputes according to the above principle.

Maajid justifies the current regimes as being Imams by equating ideologically differing terminologies. His justification being that HT do not see an issue in using differing terms for the Imam, Islam not having fixed this term. HT however does have a problem when idiomatic terms are used, discussing the issue in their first book for students "Nizaam al-Islam" (The System of Islam), or one equates a reality which violates Islam to an Islamic notion, as in this case. HT do not see the current regimes as Imams nor believe they have any legitimacy (as already explained) and therefore the above principle does not apply.

Furthermore, even if there was a legitimate Imam, he does not resolve every dispute. There are some matters which are outside his remit. For example, matters relating to his legitimacy. If he is a usurper and he believes this is acceptable, this does not oblige those who believe the usurper needs to be removed. The scholars never gave this principle for such things - rather they said you should avoid fighting due to bloodshed.

Despite the fact that many political positions can be Islamically justified given the non-prescriptive nature of Islamic law on political matters, Maajid fails to cite or reference any countries that have made the Islamic creed the sole reference in managing their societies and security being in the hands of Muslims - the fact that a law appears similar to one that may exist in Islamic law does not mean it was derived from Islam otherwise the whole world would be seen as ruling by Sharia (and also Dar al-Islam (Islamic states) according to his view of requiring Muslims to simply reside there).

Returning to the matter at hand, one can look at this matter from two perspectives – the original divine texts that HT quote with their textual meanings and what the Jurists views were.

The texts which HT quotes are not open to difference of opinion – they comprise texts that are fundamental and unambiguous. They are decisive in that the right of law/rule (hukm) is for Allah and revelation must be used when judging and ruling.

a) “The right of rule is solely for Allah"[27].

b) “Have you not seen those who declare they believe in the revelation that has come to you and to those before you? Their (real) wish is to resort together for judgement (in their disputes) to taghout"[28]

c) "...and whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed then such are the kafireen (disbelievers)"[29].

d) “Judge between them by that which Allah has revealed and do not follow their desires and beware of them lest they seduce you from some part of that which Allah has revealed to you”[30].

e) “Allah will never allow the disbelievers to have authority over the believers”[31].

When one reviews the classical jurists on this matter, they were emphatically decisive - some quotes are listed below to demonstrate the point:

Al-Razi states in his tafsir that this and the associated ayaat are general in their meaning and application requiring Muslims to implement Islam.

Ibn Abbas (ra) on this verse stated that anybody who denies a definitive judgement of Allah (swt) contained in the Sharia is a Kafir. He went on to say that anyone who says that the Rule of Allah (swt) does not have to be established or the rule of man is better than the Rule of Allah (swt) or the rules of man are just as good as the Rule of Allah (swt) is a Kafir. He also said that the one who does not deny Allah's (swt) Hukm, but believes that it is allowed to rule by other than what Allah (swt) has revealed, he is also a Kafir because he is denying that the right of Rule is solely for Allah (swt). This is the case even if he says that the rule of Allah (swt) is better than the rule implemented by man.

Ibn al-Qayyim said, "The correct view is that ruling according to something other than that which Allah has revealed includes both major and minor Kufr, depending on the position of the judge. If he believes that it is obligatory to rule according to what Allah has revealed in this case, but he turns away from that out of disobedience, whilst acknowledging that he is deserving of punishment, then this is lesser Kufr. But if he believes that it is not obligatory and that the choice is his even though he is certain that this is the ruling of Allah, then this is major Kufr.”[32]

Ibn Abeel-'Izz said, "Judging by other than what Allah has revealed could be kufr that expels one from the religion and could be a sin either a major sin or a minor one and it could be a symbolic kufr or minor kufr based on the two sayings and this all depends on the situation of the judge: So if he believes that judging by what Allah has revealed is not obligatory or that he has the option in this or if he dishonours it while being certain that it is the judgement of Allah then this is major kufr and if he believes in the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed in this instance but turns away from it while recognizing that he deserves to be punished then he is a sinner and is to be referred to as a disbeliever symbolically or upon minor disbelief"[33].

Ibn Taymiyyah said, "Undoubtedly, whoever does not believe that it is obligatory to rule according to that which Allah has revealed to His Messenger is a Kafir, and whoever thinks it is permissible to rule among people according to his own opinions, turning away and not following which Allah has revealed is also a Kafir...So in matters which are common to the Ummah as a whole, it is not permissible to rule or judge according to anything except the Quran and Sunnah. No one has the right to make the people follow the words of a scholar or Ameer or shaykh or king. Whoever believes that he can judge between people according to any such thing, and does not judge between them according to revelation is a Kafir."[34]

Ibn Katheer made reference to the Tartars at his time, "…who put together for them a law book extracted from different laws of the Jews, the Christians and the Deen of Islam. It also contained many rules taken only from their own opinion and desires that later became a system of law followed by the people and given precedence over the Book of Allah (swt) and the Sunnah of his Messenger (saw) so the ruler who does that is a Kafir."[35]

Al-Shawkani said in one of his essays:

“a) That referring for judgement to Taghoot (i.e. non Islam) constitutes major Kufr.

b) That referring for judgement to Taghoot is just one of a number of actions of Kufr, each of which in its own is sufficient to condemn the one who does it as a Kafir.

c) He gives examples of Kufr, such as people agreeing to deny women their rights of inheritance and their persisting in co-operating in that, and he states that is major kufr”[36].

If Maajid has an alternative position to this, he has not documented it in his article nor has he addressed or refuted these fundamental points aside from his passing comment “The two passages (Ayât) from the Qur'ân that are referred to, though in themselves forming a theologically definitive source for proof (Qati'i al-Thubût), their link to this particular subject matter as conditions (Shart) for the validity of a land (Dâr) is inconclusive (Zanni)".

This statement is meaningless – what does the term valid mean? And what does it mean when he conjuncts it to land, “a valid land”? Legal to trade with, legitimate to conclude treaties, permitted for living in, forbidden to fight with, acceptable for practicing Islamic rituals therein, nor requiring migration etc. And here lies the crux of the confusion in Maajid’s article and thought. His discussion of a Dar (land) is so vague and the term so broad, containing so many different issues, the discourse becomes convoluted and he fails to prove anything. It appears he wishes to avoid having to respond to HT’s actual argument that looks at one decisive aspect - the requirement of the implementation of Allah’s Sharia[38] – and the responsibility of Muslims to initiate this process as the Messenger did before them and call the world to Islam without compromising, selling-out or trying to coexist with philosophies, ideologies and religions of disbelief (kufr).

6. HT Concepts and the Adoption Process

HT emphasizes the importance and significance of its intellectual culture, verifying any and every idea rigorously before adopting it. It cites revival movements that failed historically due to the lack of thought and clarity in the intellect culture adopted, particularly in the aims and methodologies[39]. Moreover, it is often a matter of confusion what constitutes the ideas and values a movement stands for and advocates, as opposed to personal thoughts and views of its adherents along with the continuous changes exhibited due to underlying pragmatic attitudes. HT concepts must undergo the process of adoption (tabanni), to adopt the strongest views and avoid disputes regarding what is and what is not the HT official view on a matter[40]. Furthermore, it ensures conformity with existing adoption through a process of intense intellectual scrutiny and critique. The adopted books comprise:

1) System of Islam

2) Party Structure

3) Concepts of Hizb al-Tahrir

4) The Islamic state

5) The Ruling System in Islam

6) The Economic System in Islam

7) The Social System in Islam

8) The Islamic Personality (3 Volumes)

9) Funds of the Khilafah state

10) Political Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir

11) Political views of Hizb ut-Tahrir

12) Muqadimat al-Dastoor (Introduction to the constitution)

13) Al-Dausiah

14) Essential Elements of the Islamic Nafsiyyah (Disposition)

15) Organisations of the Khilafah state - in ruling and admin.

Maajid quotes the famous Wahabbite rebellion against the Ottoman state from Abdul Qadeem Zalloom’s book, “How the Khilafah was Destroyed”. From this he questions why HT criticizes this rebellion if it is permitted for one to enact their ijtihad as per the HT methodology.

This attempt to refute HT adopted thought by using material the party has never adopted[41] is unusual. Why would someone who had studied with HT for so long, failed to understand this basic idea?

Firstly, it is one that is not taught when studying the early books of the party so it is possible Maajid did not study or hear of it. However, he quotes a partial definition in one of the footnotes in his article, illustrating he is aware of the idea but maybe not the centrality of the adoption process to the definition of HT as an entity. “Adopted Party books are those books that are obligatory for a member to believe in and propagate. Members must not openly criticize adopted books even if they disagree with them...”[42]

Secondly, HT thought has inspired a range of literature to be produced by individuals influenced by their thought. To ensure this thought is not understood to be HT thought, the party only puts its name to material that it has adopted – the book “How the Khilafah was Destroyed”, cited by Maajid is not an adopted book, the name Hizb ut-Tahrir does not appear on it.

Finally, the position articulated in the book is in fact consistent with the HT adopted views and not at variance as Maajid alleges. HT prohibits the enactment of any diverse view when the Imam or Khalif has adopted on a matter and there is no dispute that the Ottomans were valid Khalifs, a fact which the Wahabbites accepted, along with the jurists of the time. As such, the Wahabis were obliged to obey and submit to the rulers and not commit treason by colluding with the British to rebel against them.

The reality post-Khilafah is one where the legitimacy of installed rulers and agents is disputed as are the ideologies and creeds they implement. Thus there is no comparison between the two scenarios.

7. What are the Discussions of Dar al-Islam/Kufr about?

Maajid states his first and “most obvious” way of showing HT’s stance to be inconclusive, and “the theological illegitimacy of enforcing their view that others are on Kufr”, is by showing “Definitions of Dār al-Kufr and Dār al-Islām are not to be found in any verse of the Qur'ān or any Ĥadīth (prophetic traditions). One or two prophetic traditions (Aĥadīth), argued by many to be of weak authenticity, refer to the term Dār al-Ĥarb and another refers to Dār al-Kufr, but all fail to offer any definition of these terms. It is primarily due to this reason that the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture (see below)”[43].

The terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam have been derived from Quran and Sunnah, with all jurists agreeing to their core meanings, namely Islam must be applied and security cannot be with non-Muslims, and some ancillary aspects being disputed. A search through the major works of jurisprudence through Muslim history confirms this[44].

Maajid does not reference where HT state “...that others are on Kufr” as this is something that he contradicts himself when he cites HT’s view on difference of opinion and their tolerant views in relation to different views.

By stating that neither terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam are not to be found in any verse of Quran or any Hadith and thereby trying to argue the resulting notions are indecisive, Maajid is exhibiting an understanding that would only be expected of a beginner studying Sharia. Whether technical terms appear in texts or not is irrelevant - what is required is that the content of definitions of such terms should embody, reflect or concur with divine texts. Nomenclature is not central to the Sharia witnessed by the absence of majority of technical definitions from divine texts and by the famous principle, "There is no objection to definitions in that they do not contradict the Sharia - for importance is not attached to the words but the meanings" - لا مشاحة في الاصطلاح ما لم يخالف الشرع؛ لذلك فليست العبرة بالمباني إنما بالمعاني

If one wished to refute using his style of argument one would state the terms Dar, Islam and Kufr do appear in a number of texts as do their synonyms Balad, Ard and Qarya. The conjunction of these and other terms in principle is also seen in the texts. Therefore the terms Dar al-Islam/al-Kufr appear and are sanctioned by the texts. Numerous examples of Islam and Kufr appear throughout the texts so no illustration is necessary - examples of Dar from authentic and non-daeef sources include:

· That abode of utter desolation (Quran 14:28) وَأَحَلُّواْ قَوْمَهُمْ دَارَ الْبَوَارِ

· And God invites unto the abode of peace, and guides him that wills onto a straight way (Quran 10:25) وَاللّهُ يَدْعُو إِلَى دَارِ السَّلاَمِ وَيَهْدِي

· Theirs shall be an abode of peace with their Sustainer (Quran 6:127) لَهُمْ دَارُ السَّلاَمِ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ وَهُوَ وَلِيُّهُمْ بِمَا كَانُواْ يَعْمَلُونَ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen” [Sahih Muslim 4294/Nisai/Darimi ]

· The Prophet (saw) said: “I have been shown the land of your hijra” [Sahih Bukhari 12:202] أُرِيتُ دَارَ هِجْرَتِكُمْ

· The Propet (saw) said: “Peace be upon you abode of the believers” [Sahih Muslim 2:53] فَقَالَ السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ دَارَ قَوْمٍ مُؤْمِنِينَ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Medina is the land of hijra and sunna” [Ahmed 1:372] الْمَدِينَةَ فَإِنَّهَا دَارُ الْهِجْرَةِ وَالسُّنَّةِ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Medina was the land of shirk” [Nisai 13:55] الْمَدِينَةَ كَانَتْ دَارَ شِرْكٍ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “And he carried me to the land of hijra” [Tirmidhi 12:176] وَحَمَلَنِي إِلَى دَارِ الْهِجْرَةِ

· Abdul Rahman bin ‘Awf was speaking with Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra) (who was the Khaleefah at the time) he said, “...until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.” [Sahih Bukhari 3713]

· Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, “Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar al-Shirk and they came to the Prophet (saw) on the night of the Bay’ah al-Aqabah.” [an-Nisa’i]

· From the companions, the letter of Khalid bin Walid mentions “...as long as he lives in the dar al-Hijrah and dar al-Islam. If they leave the dar of the Muhajirs, the dar al-Islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.” [Abu Ubaid, Kitaab al-Amwaal, pg. 98 & Abu Yusuf, Kitaab al-Kharaaj, pgs. 155-156]

Like most technically defined terms in the Islamic sciences (uloom) they do not appear in the source texts in their technical form, aside from linguistic references[45]. Maajid's argument if applied to other technical terms in the Islamic sciences, covering both decisive and indecisive ideas would result in one arguing:

· the term aqeedah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., Allah’s existence is indecisive, as is the Messenger, as is the Day of Judgement etc.)

· the terms uloom al-Quran, mushaf and asbab al-nuzool are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in Quran)

· the terms uloom al-hadith, ahad, sahih, daeef, mawdooh, mashoor and mutawatir are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the Sunnah)

· the term ijma al-sahabah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the consensus of the companions on matters including finality of the Prophethood)

· the term sirah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the entire life of the Messenger)

· the terms mandub, mubah, ruksah, azimah and fasid are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the Sharia and its laws)

Historically, the Dar (land/territory) paradigm defined the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim political sovereign entities and those between the Islamic state and its citizens from different regions and their situations[46]. These legal terms, like others deemed important in Islam (e.g., mukallaf, mandub, aqeedah, fasid, illah, ijma, isnad, matn, hadith etc), were coined by Muslim jurists in the early centuries of Islam with the formulation of the various disciplines. The terms were necessary as they came to encompass realities, rules and values, both decisive and speculative, in relation to these relationships and how to manage them according to the scriptures. Their core meanings were decisively rooted in divine texts, (branches being disputed) being determined from the Quran, the Sunnah and the practices of the companions[47]. They encompassed rules regarding matters of practicing Islam individually and collectively, migration, citizenship, war, security etc.

Over time a collective and agreed position emerged amongst the classical jurists - where Islamic rules (ahkam) were dominant along with security this comprised Dar al-Islam whilst Dar al-Harb (or Kufr) would be where there was lawlessness and one’s life or property was not safe – through jihad the aim was to ensure the Sharia was dominant and security was with the Muslims. This bi-polar division of the world and the discouragement (generally prohibition) to reside in Dar al-Harb, where security was an issue, meant that Muslims viewed Dar al-Islam as their lands whilst Dar al-Harb was viewed as the lands of the foreigners or the enemies. There were some nominal fringe discussions debated amongst some scholars regarding ancillary issues that followed from this major discussion, for instance, whether individuals living in non-Islamic lands or Islamic lands invaded/occupied by foreigners.

However, in the twentieth century, the redefinition of the Muslim world along colonial inspired lines occurred and Muslims began to migrate to the West seeking economic betterment. These trends clashed with the classical views resulting in some modern jurists reopening this discussion arguing for redefining these positions according to the new colonialist defined realities, a pragmatic position at best. These included thinkers like Faysal Mawlawi, Mana Qattan, Yusuf Qardawi, Taha Jabir al-Alwani and most recently Tariq Ramadan who broadly argued for the integration of Muslims into the West and a re-consideration of international relations. Others like al-Nabhani argued that the normative rules of Islam were relevant to all times and places and as such the reality needed reconfiguring rather than reinterpreting and reconfiguring Islam[48].

There appears to be no desire by modern jurists to address the evidences which the classical jurists used with some going as far as to even deny the existence of the evidences[49]. One hadith in question is the narration by Sulayman al-Buraydah that clearly touched on this issue[50]:

“When the Messenger of Allah appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment… He would say…”When you meet enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, accept it and restrain yourself from doing them harm. Invite them to Islam; if they respond, accept it from them and desist from fighting. Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen and inform them that if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajireen. If they refuse, tell them they will have the status of the Bedouin Muslims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims”’[51]

This text makes the point Medinah is different from other Dars, due to its rule and security, which affords privileges and obligations, different to the Bedouin Muslims who simply follow the commands of Islam. Likewise the letter of Khalid bin Walid to the people of Hira reflects the same notions:

“Khalid b. Walid wrote to the people of Hira: I have granted (the people of Hira) that any of their elderly who is unable to work, afflicted by a plague, or became poor such that his co-religionists give him alms, then his jizyah will be waived and he and his family will be provided for from the Bayt al-Mal of the Muslims as long as he lives in the Dar al-Hira and Dar al-Islam. If they leave the Dar of the Muhajirs, the Dar al-Islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.”

In fact many evidences assume the existence of a Dar paradigm without which such texts make no sense and remain devoid of any application e.g., ‘And if they incline towards peace, you also incline towards it’[52]. This is because these verses are not addressed to individuals in their personal capacities but state entities. The Dar paradigm in jurisprudence is a legal term whose principles are valid for all times unlike international geopolitics which varies over time[53]. It is law and not political analysis, and defines how things should be (normative) and not how things are (positive). It is prescriptive whilst political paradigms are descriptive (observational) and predictive. Furthermore it is not monolithic but made of independent but interrelated parts. The absence of one part does not mean the absence or irrelevance of the other (e.g., the absence of occupation or a peace treaty does not invalidate the entire model)[54].

By initiating a discussion centred on these terms, Maajid provides no conceptual clarity on the subject, leaving the reader with a limited comparison of the various wordings used in the composition of some technical terms and the conclusion that this matter was contested – a blatantly false conclusion.

HT’s quote is accurate and correct when it states: “Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims...” - none of the Jurists disputed the above when it was used in relation to the Islamic State. This importantly is the subject matter of HT and not minority Muslims living in non-Islamic societies or occupied lands - thus the discussions of the branches of the definitions by the juists are not relevant, nor is the generalised clumsy conclusion that there were differences on the entire definitions.

Furthermore, Ibn Qayyim said in relation to the same usage, “The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.”[55]

Regarding their “astonishing” acceptance that there are differences of opinion, this is not stated in relation to the definition of Dar al-Islam as per Maajid's quotes from HT in his footnote 134. HT however stated that there have been differences expressed as to when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr comprising, "1. The appearance of the rules of Kufr, 2. Bordering of Dar al-Kufr and, 3. Absence of the Security of the Muslims...", descriptive definitions and not based on divine texts.

Out of the three points, the second point is disputed amongst the classical scholars. HT state a review of the (historic) reality would eliminate the second condition that is stipulated as obviously incorrect as Dar al-Islam will always border Dar al-Kufr - does that mean there is never a Dar al-Islam? It thus leaves only the remaining two points which are agreed upon and upon which HT rely. More so, they are consistent with the decisive notions that the implementation of Sharia is required and the foreign systems and ideologies implemented in Muslim societies post-colonialism are invalid and security must be in the hands of Muslims and not foreign powers.

Thus HT's position is intellectually sound and consistent - unfortunately Maajid's analysis of it is not.

8. Are the terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr decisive in HT Adopted Culture?

Maajid’s critique of HT centres on an analysis of the juristic views of what constitutes Islamic land and when this changes to non-Islamic land. His article comprises a number of citations that form the basis of his work, quoted from “Way for Revival”[56]. However a key question that he appears to have overlooked is: does HT adopt or state that the wordings used in the formation in any of these definitions are definite and decisive (qati)?

The answer appears to be no. In the adopted book, “Mafaheem”, HT presents the results of their insight and complex analysis as to the causes of decline of the Muslim world. They then articulate the problem of institutionalized non-Islamic ideologies in the Muslim lands and provide a solution for the problem, which comprises the means for change (detailed in the books “Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change”/“Party Structure”) along with the ideology of Islam with elaboration of its shape and form in a number of books (detailed in the adopted books “System of Islam”, “Economic System”, “Social System” and “Constitution”). The underlying premises and assumptions are articulated in the series of adopted books “Islamic Personality”. At no point do they utilize the terms Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr in their analysis as definite and decisive definitions. Even the quote from “Islamic Personality”, does not state the definitions of the terms, utilising their wordings, are definite and not open to being defined using different terms – nor does HT stipulate acceptance of these terms nor enter this discussion.

What is expected and stipulated as decisive is that the Islamic lands must be ruled by Muslims and Islam, notions stated categorically and unambiguously by decisive texts, and found throughout HT’s works.

Maajid argues his objective is to show the inconsistency of HT adoption – to successfully do so, he must demonstrate what HT state as decisive is to the contrary indecisive by elaborating the different views on that - otherwise all he demonstrates is that a definition is indecisive, a matter already known and acknowledged by HT - a futile exercise. With the collapse of this point, Maajid fails in his objective from the outset.

Thus the use of this point is nothing more than a “red herring”.

9. Confusion Surrounding the Definition and Usage of Technical Terminology

A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term, word or phrase[57]. Definitions assist discussions by agreeing on common terminologies which alleviate the need to consistently refer to the underlying definition. The need for precision and accuracy in definitions is important.

Definitions are of two kinds:

· Descriptive, one which is generally used, or,

· Stipulative, one where a new meaning is imposed on an existing term.

Furthermore, they may be:

· Intensional which specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of a specific set, often seen in attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, or,

· Extensional, where it specifies its extension, for example a list naming every object that is a member of a specific set.

In Arabic, terms may have a linguistic usage and a technical usage. Both can acquire definitions in the above manner. Islamic scholarship has traditionally focused discussion on technical definitions of terms. These comprise terms that are discussed and defined by the Sharia texts (e.g., salat, zakat, hajj, siyam etc), terms that are descriptive (e.g., mutawatir, ahad, sanad, qati, zanni etc) and terms that are necessitated through textual injunctions in order to understand and apply Sharia rules (dar al-Islam, aqeedah, ijma, illah etc).

The terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr have not been explicitly defined by the Sharia texts, however the Sharia texts necessitate their recognition in order for their implementation. For example, the texts relating to war and peace in Islam recognize relations between states and attempt to regulate them.

As such, the classical jurists coined the term “Dar” (land/domain) and articulated definitions in relation to it. These definitions are generally stipulatively and intensionally defined[58] although some are extensional making like comparisons between definitions more difficult. Added to this is the fact that many jurists did not explicitly document definitions of these terms however utilised them whilst discussing jurisprudence.

The jurists generally utilised the term Dar in relation to the divine rules relating to the following concepts – as such, they were relevant when considering what constitutes Islamic land and what does not. The concepts below are mentioned in a number of divine texts, however, as most scholars generally did not enumerate them (which would be seen in an extensional definition) it is debatable which concepts are included in their definitions and which are not. There is no Sharia requirement that all these concepts are embedded in one definition - what is important is that the Sharia rules are not changed or abandoned through the use of definitions:

· authority and ruling

· security and safety

· war and peace

· practice of Islam (outside the state)

· migration

· ownership of land

An important note - HT's discussion and focus is on the first three points in relation to Muslim lands. As such, any definitions and discussions beyond this not only confuses the discussion, but is disingenuous and deceptive. HT's contention is the first three points result in a definition of Dar al-Islam that requires the Muslims rule by Sharia and the security is in their hands - on this there is no dispute.

Maajid’s review of the definitions surmises there is a major dispute amongst the jurists with some accepting a land as Islamic based on authority and security whilst others accept ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present whilst others stipulate Islamic authority. He thus concludes from this superficial understanding of the definitions that there is a dispute on the underlying Shariah rules.

Firstly he has mixed definitions from the six points above, avoiding comparing like with like, as it would not support his conclusion. Despite this, he has not quoted one scholar who defines Dar al-Islam based on the ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present - all his quotes assume the presence of Islamic authority (NB: It is not being argued that such views may not exist as it is acceptable to state any land is Islamic based on the ability to practice Islam - however it is not possible to define the Islamic State itself on this basis alone as the texts relating to ruling do not accept Muslims ruling by kufr or security in the hands of non-Muslims).

If the categories are corrected and the concepts untangled the following nomenclature emerges, which is what HT state, is consistent with Islam and the traditional scholars and inconsistent with Maajid's portrayal:

Islamic State (Dar al-Islam - agreed upon)

· authority and ruling

· security and safety

Non-Islamic Lands (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb - disputed terminology)

· practice of Islam (outside the state)

· migration

· ownership of land

Relations between Islamic State (Dar al-Islam) and Non-Islamic States (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb etc.) - disputed terminology

· war and peace

Transformation of the Islamic State (Dar al-Islam) to a Non-Islamic States (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb) - partially disputed

· appearance of the rules of kufr in it - agreed upon

· it borders Dar al-Kufr - disputed

· there does not remain the security of the Muslims - agreed upon

As can be seen, there is no dispute on the core understanding of what is meant by Dar al-Islam, the notion of implementing Sharia and security by Muslims in their domain and the absence of these means the state becomes Dar al-Kufr - differences were discussed in relation to political realities outside of this domain, some wishing to extend this definition, and others seeking to limit it. Those who extended the definition and used the terminology such as Dar al-Islam for labelling non-Islamic lands caused potential confusion for the non-initiated and ammunition for those with dubious agendas. One can legitimately state there was debate on the extended usage of the term (furu' or juziyyat), however, it would be nothing more than sophistry to say there was a dispute on the core meaning after scrutinising the classical texts .

Secondly, when not misquoting definitions, Maajid attempts to interpret and derive definitions from discussions he quotes, “ijtihad on ijtihad” - something prohibited - and then impose them on the discussion. His citations of Dusuqi, Bujayrami and Mawardi are such examples. Jurists discussed all the above issues without limiting or disputing the entire meaning of Dar al-Islam in the way Maajid is attempting to portray as can be seen in the example from al-Mughni (vol. 8, p. 457) under the discussion of people with respect to migration (hijra): "One of those who must migrate is one who is unable to show his deen and is not able to establish the obligatory duties (wajibaat) of his deen due to his residence with the unbelievers. On such it is obligatory to migrate as Allah said: "Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end." (Quran 4:97)”

Thirdly, this argument is conceptually flawed as it focuses entirely on the variations of the form of definitions whilst ignoring the intended meanings (i.e., the substance of the definitions), putting the cart before the horse so to speak. It also violates the usooli principle which makes this very point: "There is no objection to definitions in that they do not contradict the Sharia - for importance is not attached to the words but the meanings" - لا مشاحة في الاصطلاح ما لم يخالف الشرع؛ لذلك فليست العبرة بالمباني إنما بالمعاني

Thus, even if for the sake of argument, a scholar was to define a land as Dar al-Islam based on the ability of a Muslim to practice his deen, he is not stating that it is legitimate to rule and enforce kufr, but is highlighting the fact that the Muslim does not need to migrate to somewhere he can practice his deen. Likewise, if one were to define the land as Dar al-kufr if the ruling system is kufr, he would not be stating that Muslims cannot practice their deen there and must migrate – he is stating that Islam requires the system needs changing. As such, the two definitions would not be in conflict in substance, simply in form. Maajid has ignored this point and deemed a contradiction when there is none.

He has also failed to note the implications of his analysis if his reasoning was applied to other definitions. It is well recognised that virtually every term in Islam is contested, even those as fundamental as Imaan, Muslim and Quran – one would be hard pressed to identify a definition which had an absolute consensus. Would one conclude these (and all) matters are doubtful and speculative? Obviously not. Some examples are highlighted below though the argument could similarly be applied to many others.

· Definition of the Quran

The definition of the term, Quran, according to the Hanafi linguist Jurjani in his book on technical definitions is “revelation to the Messenger compiled in the Musaahif and transmitted through tawatur means without doubt”[59].

According to Sharawi[60] it is “speech of God, revealed to the final Prophet in the Arabic language, worship when recited, compiled in the Uthman mushaf and transmitted via tawatur (decisive) means”.

And according to Aamidi “The word of Allah is revealed to his slave Muhammad in Arabic. It is a miracle (Ijaaz) in even the shortest surah, it is written down and narrated to us through tawatur, through which we worship Allah by reading it, it starts with surah al-Fatiha and ends with al-Naas”[61].

If the definitions are compared, it is apparent there are a number of differences, including “speech of God”, “in the Arabic language” and “worship when recited”. If Maajid’s reasoning was applied in this case, one would conclude that there are massive diffences in the definition of Quran being the speech of God or in Arabic - as these points are disputed hence the Quran must be zanni (speculative). However, the jurists (as well as all Muslims) did not dispute these matters and agreed they are decisive (qati) due to the evidence - difference in selection of the words of the Quran are irrelevant.

· Definition of Shaheed (martyr)

According to the Hanafis: “One who is killed by the pagans, or is found killed in the battle bearing a mark of any wound, whether external or internal - such as blood emerging from an eye or the like.”[62]

“Anyone who is killed while fighting pagans, or rebels, or brigands, by a means attributed to the enemy - whether directly or by consequence - is a shaheed, anyone who is killed by a means not specifically attributed to [an action of] the enemy is not considered a shaheed.”[63]

According to the Malikis: “One killed while fighting warring unbelievers only, even if killed on Islamic land such as if the enemy attacked the Muslims, [even if he] did not fight on account of being unaware or asleep, [and even if] killed by a Muslim who mistook him for an unbeliever, or trampled by a horse, or mistakenly by his own sword or arrow, or having fallen into a well or from a cliff during the fighting.”[64]

According to the Shafi’s: “One who is killed in fighting unbelievers, facing and not running away, for the raising of Allah’s word…and not for any worldly motive.”[65]

Ibn Hajar has mentioned fourteen means by which a person can acquire the title, some of them specifically related to being killed in the path of Allah and others not.[66]

According to the Hanbalis: “One who dies in a battle with the unbelievers, whether male or female, adult or not, whether killed by the unbelievers, or by his own weapon in error, or by having fallen off his mount, or having been found dead with no mark, provided he was sincere.”[67]

From the above, it may be argued that martyrdom is speculative as the definitions are contested, whereas the notion of martydom whilst engaged in war ordained by Allah is in fact a decisive concept in Islam. There are speculative issues in aspects that relate to it but that does not detract from the decisiveness of the issue.

Technical terms are also used in different contexts to reflect varying realities – for instance, the definition and qualification of the terms mujahid/shaheed of the dunya and akhira are defined differently, in order to apply Sharia rules. However, one does not conclude from these that the whole matter of being a mujahid/shaheed is disputed simply due to the attempt by scholars in articulating concise and precise definitions reflecting texts and their various rules. The term Sunnah for instance has several technical usages across the different sciences, even multiple usages within a given science. It is used to refer to Masdar al-Sharia (source of law), Sirah (kutub al-sunnah biography), Hadith (kutub al-sunnah narrations), Mandoub (recommended), Nafl (superogratory), Medina (Dar al-Sunnah) etc. These multi-usages of a term were normal and accepted throught Islamic history and importantly, never contradicted Sharia rules.

Likewise, some jurists[68] also utilised the terms Dar al-Islam in relation to ownership of land conquered by non-Muslims (in a manner contemporary Muslims allude to Spain being Muslim land) or whether Muslims could practice their religion there or not - categorising such lands Dar al-Islam or al-Kufr was an issue of which definition they would be a more appropriate subset. These considerations never conflicted with divine texts and the rules thereof. Jurist did not attempt to justify the rule of non-Islamic law or creeds solely focusing on issues of ownership or practice - a point Maajid has failed to note.

The Jurists did however entertain the notion that the rule by the Islamic Sharia was required. Thus it is seen Abu Hanifah believed an unjust ruler must be fought, let alone one who rules by kufr. That is why he funded the rebellion of Imam Zayd against the Umayyad Khalifah Hisham bin Abdel Malik bin Marwan and he funded the rebellion of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah against al-Mansur, the Abbasid Khalifah.

The point here is not a dispute on definitions. The point here, which HT adopted culture argues and thus makes the whole definition dispute irrelevant, is that Islam must be implemented in the Muslim lands, as it was historically, and it is forbidden to implement/enforce non-Islamic ideologies. Not one of Maajid’s quoted scholars differs with HT on this.

10. Systematic Misquotation of the Classical Scholars

Maajid makes the emotive statement “...the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture”[69]. However, upon checking the quotes Maajid has used in relation to the classical scholars, a number of discrepancies emerge. Anyone can make a mistake in referencing or quoting - we are all human. However, when unintended errors or mistakes occur, they are usually inconsistent - for them to all consistently lead to an intended conclusion is highly suspicious. Maajid's article misrepresents the classical jurists on a number of points by systematically misquoting and misinterpreting them to support his conclusions[70]. Some examples are cited to illustrate this point below.

· Bujayrimi’s Quote

Al-Bujayrimi incorporates the ideas mentioned above in his actual definition which Maajid ignored. He instead selected only a part of al-Bujayrimi’s explanation of his definition whilst ignoring the definition itself and the rest of the explanation - the consistency of his misquoting is indicative he is more interested in achieving a predetermined goal rather than determining the truth. Maajid said, "al-Imam al-Bujayrimi... maintains that Dār al-Islām is a place where Muslims reside even if there are non-Muslims present.”

However the actual quote of Sulayman bin Mohammed al-Bujayrimi in "Sharh al-Bujayrimi ala al-Khatib" is as follows:

شرح الروض. قوله: (في دار الإسلام) أي بأن يسكنها المسلمون وإن كان فيها أهل ذمة أو فتحها المسلمون وأقروها بيد الكفار أو كانوا يسكنونها ثم جلاهم الكفار عنها "شرح الروض"

"(About Dar al-Islam) that Muslims live there even if there were with them there ahl al-dhimma (those protected by the Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it."

And in his book, "Nihaya al-Muhtaj", al-Bujayrimi provides an actual definition of Dar al-Islam along with an explanation of it:

وقال الشّافعيّة: هي كلّ أرض تظهر فيها أحكام الإسلام - ويراد بظهور أحكام الإسلام: كلّ حكم من أحكامه، أو يسكنها المسلمون وإن كان معهم فيها أهل ذمّة، أو فتحها المسلمون، وأقرّوها بيد الكفّار، أو كانوا يسكنونها، ثمّ أجلاهم الكفّار

"Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear and it is intended by the phrase "appearance of the Islamic laws" every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma (those protected by Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it."

Maajid’s selective quote is presented as Bujayrami's definition when it comes from only a part of Bujayrimi's elaboration - he also mistranslates the portion he does quote by translating the term "ahl al-dhimmah" who are legally protected non-Muslims by the Islamic state rendered simply as non-Muslims. This mistranslation leaves the reader with quite a different understanding when compared to the actual translation, especially on a discussion centered around the political or non-political nature of a definition.

Maajid insinuates Bujayrami defines the term with a meaning that applies only to individual practice of Islam in a Kufr land - this is incorrect as the actual definition contains the words "appearance of Islamic rules", which is general and from the language this would include both societal and individual rules of Islam - i.e., appearance of the rules of Islam without restriction. This would most certainly include the rulers as he states Dar al-Islam is the ENTIRE LAND WHERE THE ISLAMIC RULES APPEAR, as it is unqualified without any references limiting the matter to individual matters alone – furthermore, he clearly mentions terms in his definition including “ahl al-dhimma”, “opened up by Muslims” and “it was given to govern by non-Muslims” which all relate to authority. As such this the exact meaning of the Arabic language and is not an ideologically inspired reading.

Maajid’s quote of a part of al-Bujayrimi’s explanation fails to translate an important part correctly which changes the meaning of even the part he quotes i.e., “even if there were ahl al-dhimma” – which indicates the Muslims are living under Islamic authority, (as ahl al-dhimma as already mentioned do not come into being unless the land is under Islamic rule/authority and these people pay the jizyah and are afforded security and do not have the obligation of participating war) - resonating with the authoritative Hanafi definitions.

Revealingly, al-Bujayrimi discusses this issue in the chapter of Jihad, and the whole chapter details the Imam’s responsibilities and involvement in this obligation - thus Bujayrimi's discussion in this context clarifies the importance of Islam in the political context of his definition.

An interesting observation that shows the absurdity that results in Maajid's conclusions from his interpretation of this and other definitions to be discussed. If any jurist defined Dar al-Islam solely as the ability to practice in a non-Islamic land in security, this would mean that all lands that containing Muslims (regardless of number) would be Islamic lands and would not therefore require anything further to be done - thus there would be no requirement to try to impose the obligations of hudud (penal), jihad, zakat, jizya, arbitration etc a situation that contradicts definite texts and one that the remaining texts of the same scholars contradict by discussing the necessity of an Imam and the implementation of Islam - as such Maajid's interpretation of the classical scholars definitions of Dar al-Islam is little more than a blunder.

Finally, to seal the point, even if one for the sake of argument (or otherwise) was to accept that the definition indeed intended to include non-Islamic lands where Muslims resided, the effect at best would be that the definition of Dar al-Islam , according to al-Bujayrimi, would be broadened (akin to Mawardi's definition below), comprising a core element (authority of Islam/security) which is not contested and the branches which were contested (as already discussed in detail above). This would be akin to Sunnah comprising tawatur and ahad elements, the latter being disputed and indefinite and the former not; or imaan comprising belief and action with the latter disputed. It does not support Maajid's argument as he is trying to demonstrate the entire definition is contested (or at minimum the core aspects of it are, i.e., the need for Islamic rule and authority) as HT's arguments are built on the core and not the branches.

This definition does not support his argument and is not relevant to the discussion.

· Mawardi’s Quote

Maajid quotes Imam Shawkani from Nayl al-Awtar as stating that Maawardi believed “If it becomes possible to manifest ones religion (Din) in any Kufr land, then that land becomes by such a virtue Dār al-Islām”. Shawkani does not state this in his book at the cited section – he quotes Mawardi in his chapter of Jihad in relation to the initial obligation of jihad, whether it is singular (ayn) or collective (kifaya). Mawardi’s view he states is that “the obligation was originally individual on all of those who emigrated from Mekkah...”[71].

However in a much later section, Hijra (migration), Shawkani's full quote is below, (the final line shows Shawkani's comment which has been omitte in Maajid's quotation) and the translation has also been corrected:

وَفِيهِمْ نَزَلَتْ : { إنَّ الَّذِينَ تَوَفَّاهُمْ الْمَلَائِكَةُ ظَالِمِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ قَالُوا فِيمَ كُنْتُمْ ؟ قَالُوا كُنَّا مُسْتَضْعَفِينَ فِي الْأَرْضِ ، قَالُوا أَلَمْ تَكُنْ أَرْضُ اللَّهِ وَاسِعَةً فَتُهَاجِرُوا فِيهَا } الْآيَةَ ، وَهَذِهِ الْهِجْرَةُ بَاقِيَةُ الْحُكْمِ فِي حَقِّ مِنْ أَسْلَمَ فِي دَارِ الْكُفْرِ وَقَدَرَ عَلَى الْخُرُوجِ مِنْهَا .

وَقَالَ الْمَاوَرْدِيُّ : إذَا قَدَرَ عَلَى إظْهَارِ الدِّينِ فِي بَلَدٍ مِنْ بِلَادِ الْكُفْرِ فَقَدْ صَارَتْ الْبَلَدُ بِهِ دَارَ إسْلَامٍ ، فَالْإِقَامَةُ فِيهَا أَفْضَلُ مِنْ الرِّحْلَةِ عَنْهَا لِمَا يُتَرَجَّى مِنْ دُخُولِ غَيْرِهِ فِي الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَلَا يَخْفَى مَا فِي هَذَا الرَّأْيِ مِنْ الْمُصَادَمَةِ لِأَحَادِيثِ الْبَابِ الْقَاضِيَةِ بِتَحْرِيمِ الْإِقَامَةِ فِي دَارِ الْكُفْرِ .

""Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end." (Quran 4:97)” ...If one is able to manifest their din in any kufr land then that land thereby becomes by him ie by that individual a Dar Islam. So residence there is preferable than journeying away from it in the hope others may embrace Islam. And it is apparent that this view conflicts with the ahadith (narrations) in the chapter of al-Qadiya prohibiting residence in the Dar al-Kufr."

Maajid uses Mawardi's quote as part of his argument to suggest a major difference amongst the scholars. To understand Mawardi's view one must review his other works, as the above unreferenced quote from a secondary source does not comprise his definition. The most important works on this topic are al-Ahkam al-Sultanniya (his famous manual on Islamic Governance) and al-Insaaf - in the latter Mawardi said, "Dar al-Harb is Dar al-Kufr, where Kufr law is dominant" (Vol 4 pg. 122).

When discussing state governance and international relations in al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, Mawardi uses the terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb (Kufr) in their usual contexts, implying he has a simiar understanding of the concept. Tellingly he does not allow any exceptions to these rules in relation to non-Islamic societies, where Muslim individuals live, giving any accordance as being like Dar al-Islam.

The quote above utilises the term dar Islam with a new usage (akin to the multi-usages of the term Sunnah in Islamic sciences discussed previousy). Its usage by Mawardi is relative and personalised - it describes where an individual is able to practice his religion freely then for him that reality is the same as if he was in the Islamic state - he therefore should not migrate as the texts ordering migration only require this where his reality is he cannot practice his religion. The term بِهِ bihi refers to the person and the transformation of Dar al-Kufr to a Dar Islam in his view. Mawardi does not believe the international relations between states change due to this relative change nor that non-Islamic rule is acceptable and should not be Islamic.

As such this view widens the definition of Dar al-Islam (and as such, this part of the definition is disputed) however it does not show the core discussions are contested (akin to the usool al-ittiqaad (core creed) and furu al-ittiqaad (branches of creed) discussions that were delineated by the scholars). Mawardi's quote here is again not pertinent to the HT discussion and its usage is mistaken.

HT, unlike Maajid, have relied on Mawardi's primary sources ignoring quotes from secondary sources thereby avoiding such mistakes and confusion.

· Kasani’s Quote

Maajid lifts the criteria of when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr and presents it as his definition, without documenting Kasani’s actual definition which Kasani discussed in Badai al-Sanaai clarifying the two essential aspects of Dar al-Islam that are understood from the divine texts, akin to HT’s elaboration in "Shaksiyyah Islamiyya":

قَوْلِهِمَا أَنَّ قَوْلَنَا دَارُ الْإِسْلَامِ وَدَارُ الْكُفْرِ إضَافَةُ دَارٍ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَإِلَى الْكُفْرِ ، وَإِنَّمَا تُضَافُ الدَّارُ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ أَوْ إلَى الْكُفْرِ لِظُهُورِ الْإِسْلَامِ أَوْ الْكُفْرِ فِيهَا ، كَمَا تُسَمَّى الْجَنَّةُ دَارَ السَّلَامِ ، وَالنَّارُ دَارَ الْبَوَارِ ؛ لِوُجُودِ السَّلَامَةِ فِي الْجَنَّةِ ، وَالْبَوَارِ فِي النَّارِ وَظُهُورُ الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِهِمَا ، فَإِذَا ظَهَرَ أَحْكَامُ الْكُفْرِ فِي دَارٍ فَقَدْ صَارَتْ دَارَ كُفْرٍ فَصَحَّتْ الْإِضَافَةُ ، وَلِهَذَا صَارَتْ الدَّارُ دَارَ الْإِسْلَامِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِ الْإِسْلَامِ فِيهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ شَرِيطَةٍ أُخْرَى ، فَكَذَا تَصِيرُ دَارَ الْكُفْرِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِ الْكُفْرِ فِيهَا وَاَللَّهُ - سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى - أَعْلَمُ . ( وَجْهُ ) قَوْلِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ - رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ - أَنَّ الْمَقْصُودَ مِنْ إضَافَةِ الدَّارِ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ لَيْسَ هُوَ عَيْنَ الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ ، وَإِنَّمَا الْمَقْصُودُ هُوَ الْأَمْنُ وَالْخَوْفُ . وَمَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ الْأَمَانَ إنْ كَانَ لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ فِيهَا عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، وَالْخَوْفُ لِلْكَفَرَةِ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، فَهِيَ دَارُ الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَإِنْ كَانَ الْأَمَانُ فِيهَا لِلْكَفَرَةِ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، وَالْخَوْفُ لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، فَهِيَ دَارُ الْكُفْرِ وَالْأَحْكَامُ مَبْنِيَّةٌ عَلَى الْأَمَانِ وَالْخَوْفِ لَا عَلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ ، فَكَانَ اعْتِبَارُ الْأَمَانِ وَالْخَوْفِ أَوْلَى

“Dar al-Islam and Dar al-kufr is the conjunction of Dar (land) with Islam and Kufr – and when you conjunct Dar to Islam or Kufr, it is determined by the presence of Islam or Kufr therein. Like when you say Paradise land of peace, or Hell land of torment, you find peace in paradise and torment in hell and the appearance of Islam and Kufr is the appearance of its rules. And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus the appropriate term. And thus Dar became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the laws of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr laws in it (and Allah knows best). And the crux of this is according to Abu Hanifa (ra) in relation to the land being Islamic or otherwise is not the essence of Islam or kufr but the issues of aman (security) and khawf (anxiety/fear) – and its meaning is that if the safety was for the Muslims absolutely and anxiety for non-Muslims absolutely so it is Dar al-Islam and if the safety was for the non-Muslim absolutely and anxiety for Muslims then it is Dar al-kufr and the ahkam depend on the safety and anxiety and not on Islam and kufr so it was considered safety and anxiety foremost.”

· Ibn Qayyim’s Quote

Ibn Qayyim’s view is the most critical of Maajid’s usage and conclusions from the quotes – Ibn Qayyim’s conclusion was that there is a collective (majority) position amongst the jurists which is congruent with HT’s position with an emphasis of the dominance of Islam.

Ibn Qayyim said, “The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.”[72]

· Dusuqi’s Quote

Dusuqi, in his chapter on Jihad, discusses the Sharia rules in relation to non-Muslims who enter the Muslim lands, take their wealth and later try to resell it to them. Following this he extends the discussion in relation to the occupation of Muslim lands and when those lands become Dar al-Harb. In this context he states that the lands remain Islamic despite their occupation so long most or all the signs (sha’air) of Islam are established there.

Maajid has taken this statement out of its actual context which is when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Harb and presented it as the Maliki view of Dar al-Islam. At no point does Dusuqi state or indicate that this is the definition of Dar al-Islam (a definition in fact not in his book).

At best the same comments apply in Dusuqi's case as they do in al-Bujayrimi and Muwardi's cases above - there is no dispute by Dusuqi on the core aspects of what constitutes Dar al-Islam - the difference is again on the branches.

The original quote is below in its full context.

( قوله : ولو قدم حربي بأمان إلخ ) أي ، وأما لو دخلوا بلادنا بالقهر ونهبوا منها أمتعة وأرادوا بيعها فيها فلا يجوز الشراء منهم ، وهي باقية على ملك أربابها فلهم أخذها ممن اشتراها بقصد التملك مجانا وأما إن اشتراها بقصد الفداء لربها فالأحسن أخذها بالفداء ؛ لأن بلاد الإسلام لا تصير دار حرب بأخذ الكفار لها بالقهر ما دامت شعائر الإسلام قائمة فيها ( قوله : اشتراء سلعه ) أي من الحربي الذي دخل بها بلادنا بأمان ( قوله : أو ؛ لأنه بشرائها يفوتها على المالك ) هذا التعليل هو الظاهر ، وأما ما قبله فيأتي أيضا فيما إذا كان المشتري هو المالك مع أنه لا يكره له شراؤها ، ولذا رده أبو الحسن انظر بن . ( قوله : وبهبتهم لها ) أي بعد دخولهم بها بلادنا بأمان ، وأما ما أخذوه من بلادنا نهبا ووهبوه فيها فلا يملكه الموهوب له ، ولا يفوت على مالكه بالهبة ثم إن ظاهر المصنف أنه لا كراهة في قبول الهبة كالشراء ، وإلا كان يقول ، وكره لغير المالك اشتراء سلعة واتهابها أي قبول هبتها وبعضهم سوى بينهما في الكراهة . وبالجملة فالمسألة ذات خلاف ، والتعليل الثاني في كراهة الشراء موجود في الهبة قاله شيخنا ( قوله : أو ؛ لأنه ) أي الحربي ( قوله : لا أحرار مسلمون قدموا بهم ) سواء كانوا ذكورا أو إناثا فلا تنزع منهم جبرا عليهم لا بالقيمة ، ولا بدونها ، ولا يمنعون من الرجوع بهم بلادهم كما لا ينزع منهم شيء من أموال المسلمين التي قدموا بها عندنا بأمان ، وقد كانوا أخذوها غصبا أو نهبا لا سرقة كما مر ، وأما ما أخذوه من بلادنا بعد استيلائهم عليها بالقهر ، وقدرنا على نزعه منهم قبل أن يذهبوا به لبلادهم فإنه ينزع منهم ؛ لأن بلاد الإسلام لا تصير دار حرب بمجرد استيلائهم عليها بل حتى تنقطع إقامة شعائر الإسلام عنها ، وأما ما دامت شعائر الإسلام أو غالبها قائمة فيها فلا تصير دار حرب

Relisting Maajid’s summary of the positions of the different schools of thought produces quite a different result, one that is remarkably similar to HT’s presentation of the matter in "Shaksiyyah Islamiyya" that Maajid refers to[73]:

“Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims even if its inhabitants were Muslims or Zimmis. And the scholars (fuqaha) also said that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam by the appearance of the Islamic rules within it. However they differed as to what changes Dār al-Islām into Dār al-Kufr. Some jurists (Mujtahidīn) said that Dār al-Islām does not become a Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions: firstly, the appearance of the rules of Kufr in it. Secondly, that it is bordering Dār al-Kufr. Thirdly, that there does not remain in it any Muslim or non-Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) secured by the first security (Amān) which is the security of Muslims.”

THE SHAFI SCHOOL

al-Rāfi'ī states, “It is not conditional to Dār al-Islām that Muslims reside there, rather being in the hands of the Imam and his Islām is sufficient.”

(corrected) Imam Mawardi said, “Dar al-Harb is Dar al-Kufr, where Kufr law is dominant.” [al-Insaaf,Vol. 4 pg. 122]

(corrected) al-Bujayrimi said, “Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear” further elaborating this definition “by this it is meant every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma, or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it”

Al-Ba'lawi considers “Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is Dār al-Islām, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.”

THE HANAFI SCHOOL

Al-Sarakhsī defines it as “A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof is that Muslims are secure therein.”

Al-Sarkhasi said, “A Dar (piece of land/nation) becomes Dar al-Muslimeen (Islamic nation) when the Islamic rules become dominant (and apparent).” [Sarkhasi, Sharh as-Seerah al-Kabeer, Vol. 5 pg. 2197]

Al-Kāsānī states, “There is no difference between our companions (the Ĥanafī's) that Dār al-Kufr becomes Dār al-Islām due to the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein.”

(corrected) Al-Kasani said “And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus this is the appropriate term. And Dar (a land) became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the ahkam (laws) of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr ahkam in it”

(corrected) Al-Kasani also said, “There is no disagreement among the ahnaaf (scholars of the Hanafi Madhab), that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam, when the rules of Islam becomes dominant. Our brothers only dispute on how Dar al-Islam transfers to become Dar al-Kufr. Our Imam (Abu Hanifa) said, “Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr in three (situations); when the law and order becomes Kufr, when the state has a border with a Kufr (state) without treaty or when there is no longer any security for the Muslim or the Dhimmi (citizens).” [Badai al-Sanaai, Vol. 7 pg. 131]

Abū Yūsuf believed, “The land is considered Dār al-Islām by the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein even if the majority of its people where disbelievers, and it is considered Dār al-Kufr for the appearance of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Kufr therein even if the majority of its people were Muslims”

Ibn ‘Ābidīn stated, “Indeed, Dār al-Ĥarb becomes Dār al-Islām by establishing the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām such as the Friday prayer and the 'Eid prayer; even if the indigenous non-Muslims remain therein and that country is not adjoined to Dār al-Islām.”

THE HANBALI SCHOOL

Ibn Mufliĥ writes that Dār al-Islām is every place where the rulings of Muslims are predominant.

Ibn Muflih stated “There are only two, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr. Any Dar (domain) where Islamic law is dominant is Dar al-Islam, and any domain where Kufr law is dominant is Dar al-Kufr, there are only these two camps [Al-Adaab al-Shari’ah, Vol. 1 pg. 190]

Ibn al-Qayyim maintains “Dār al-Islām is the land upon where Muslims descended and upon where the rulings of Islām were executed. Any land upon where the rulings of Islām were not executed was not Dār al-Islām.”

(corrected) Ibn Qayyim said, “The Jumhour (majority) of theUlema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant, that is Dar al-Islam If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered. [Ibn Qayyim, Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah, Vol. 1 pg. 366]

THE ZAHIRI SCHOOL

Ibn Hazm states, “Because the land (Dār) is associated to the person dominant over it, its ruler and its king.” [74]

On reviewing the corrected list, Ibn Qayyim’s view that the jamhoor (majority) had a consistent view relating to Islamic rules and authority begins to emerge not that portrayed by Maajid, more so with the inclusion of additional quotes of some other jurists including al-Nabhani of HT[75]:

Taqiudeen al-Nabhani (Shafii) said, “The truth is that in considering the land as Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr, two matters must be looked into: firstly, the rule by Islam and secondly the security by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority (sultan). If the land augments these two elements i.e. it rules by Islam and the security is by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority, then it becomes a Dar al-Islam and changes from a Dar al-Kufr to a Dar al-Islam. Whereas if it loses one of the two, it does not become a Dar al-Islam. Similarly if Dar al-Islam does not rule by the rule of Islam then it is Dar al-Kufr. The same if it rules by Islam but its security is not by the security of Muslims i.e. their authority, then it also becomes Dar al-Kufr. Hence all the lands of Muslims today are Dar al-Kufr because they do not rule by Islam”[76].

Qadi Abu Ya’la (Hanbali) said, “Any country where the law is Kufr (disbelief) instead of Islam is Dar al-Kufr”[77].

Mohammad bin Ali al-Shawkani (Zaidi) said, “When we speak about a Dar (dominion) by whoever’s word being dominant, we mean if the command and prohibition is for the Muslims, in a way that no one from the Kuffar becomes dominant with his Kufr except by what is granted him from Islam, then that is considered Dar ul-Islam”[78].

Sayyid Qutb said, “The whole world in the eyes of Islam is divided into two, the first is Dar al-Islam, and the second is Dar al-Harb. Dar al-Islam is where the Shari’ah of Islam alone is implemented, regardless of whether the inhabitants are all Muslims or Muslims mixed with Dhimmi (Jews and Christians) or if all of the citizens are Dhimmi with only some Muslims in power. Dar al-Harb is any land where the Kufr law is dominant even if everybody in the land is Muslim"[79].

Historically no jurist disputed or rejected the core decisive textual issues, however certain branches were differed over due to ijtihad on zanni texts, (e.g., the signs (sha'air) of Islam from the narrations instructing warriors not to attack lands where azan is heard or mosques exist). The core issues comprise implementation of the Islamic creed and security in societal life along with all aspects thereof which are decisive - this state which all confirm is Dar al-Islam is then the basis of discussions of jurisprudence in relation to non-Islamic states (harb/kufr). The scholars Maajid quotes are congruent with this understanding and there are no differences on this point despite minor variations in the wording of their definitions.

11. Monolithic theories?

Maajid’s thesis that HT’s theory is nothing but a legal opinion assumes the party's understanding is homogenous which is incorrect. HT’s work comprises an understanding, definition and articulation of the problem and reality, following which is the process of scriptural analysis to determine the proposed normative solution. Aspects of each process may or may not be decisive depending on the case in question – it is most certainly not homogenous.

HT’s assertion would be that the discussions of the problem, its reality and associated rules of jurisprudence that are discussed are decisive whereas aspects of its methodology for change, systems and proposed policies are open to interpretation. To bunch the lot together as Maajid has done and state it is all nothing but legal opinion which is indecisive is erroneous.

The decisive reality which HT's ijtihad of transformation is built upon has not been addressed by Maajid especially as it is elaborated in a number of adopted HT books which all who study with HT are required to study (“The Islamic State”, being one such example and summarised in section 3 above).

HT have never argued that their attempt at changing the colonialist inspired reality is one where the methodology is decisive or alternative views (ijtihad) are kufr - it is acknowledged there are potentially alternative ijtihads. Maajid however fails to cite any other such methodology in his critique; however, in subsequent media interviews he has approvingly spoken of the legitimacy and openness of one of the most avowed secular systems in the Muslim world, the Turkish political system.

12. Will HT unify the Muslim world through violent means?

This is a point Maajid (and his friend Ed Hussain) mention and emphasise in the media in an attempt to link HT with violence - “every single Muslim government, then forcibly unite them into one military state even if it means killing millions of people”. In his article, he fails to cite any text HT where this has been stated.

Maajid’s reference in his interviews to “How the Khilafah was destroyed” as the source for this view is incorrect – firstly this book is not an adopted HT book, a fact that is easily verifiable by the absence of HT's name on the front of it (the importance of adoption to HT has already been discussed in detail). Secondly the pages highlighted by Newsnight during Maajid’s interview of the 11/09/2007 refer to a discussion not about the foreign policy of the forthcoming Caliphate, however, a policy, based on Islamic notions of vital issues, the state should have enforced that would have prevented the political intrigue that plagued its final days and its eventual dismemberment.

The full context of discussion from the chapter "The vital issues according to Islam" is:

a) Whosoever changes their religion (apostasy from Islam) the penal punishment is death - Islamic evidences supporting this are quoted along with an example from Imam Ali's rule and the subversive activities of Mustapha Kemal during the Ottoman period without this punishment being applied. The author concludes this is a vital issue and no matter how many people apostasise from Islam, the Islamic State should enforce capital punishment even if it amounted to millions (a conclusion which it is argued emanates from divine texts)[80].

b) A similar discussion arises in relation to the unity of the Islamic State; the author states this rule in the context of the dismemberment of the Khilafah state and not in the context of unifying the currently divided Muslim lands, "The situation reached the point where Muslims lived in several states...Hence it came as no surprise when Mustapha Kemal declared the dismemberment of Turkey from the rest of the Islamic lands... So the calamity took place and the Muslims became indifferent towards having to live in several states...Hence it is imperative to restore this issue to its rightful place and to consider it as a vital issue, THUS PREVENTING THE DISMEMBERMENT OF ANY COUNTRY FROM THE BODY OF THE KHILAFAH even if this led to several years of fighting and even if it led to killing of millions of Muslims"[81].

c) The concept is provided in relation to the matter of kufr law being implemented in the Khilafah state[82].

Nowhere does it state in “How the Khilafah was destroyed” that HT intends to spill blood or kill in order to unify the countries in the future - something that it goes to great lengths to avoid whilst working for the establishment of the Islamic State adopting peaceful means. The title of the book, its historical analysis and the discussion quoted above all indicate clearly that vital issues were left unchecked in the historic demise of the Ottoman state. Had it rigorously enforced these issues internally it may have maintained the integrity of the state and prevented the catastrophe that struck it. Moving forward, these issues need to be considered in relation to the internal matters of the future Khilafah state - in relation to unifying the Muslim lands, HT believe this can be done through numerous political styles and means according to the political landscape at the time.

Furthermore, in its adopted book, “Party Structure”, HT state:

“Islam should be propagated universally while working to implement it must be confined to one or several countries until it becomes firmly established. Once established, the Islamic State would naturally grow until it encompasses all the Islamic countries. Then the state would propagate Islam to the rest of the world, because the Islamic State must convey the Islamic da’wah as an eternal and universal message for all mankind.”[83]

Maajid’s interpretation and application of these ideas in relation to what the potential foreign policy of the Khilafah will be outside the state is incorrect, speculative and unsubstantiated and appears little more than scaremongering, propaganda and a dishonest attempt at linking HT with violence, a theme he revisits regularly.

13. New Political Pawns?

In the aftermath of 9/11, Tony Blair said he "believed passionately that we are at mortal risk" from Islamism[84]. Since 2003, there have been a number of articles and conferences written globally suggesting that HT might present a serious threat and there have been a number of orchestrated attempts to try to link HT to terrorism.

Jean-Francois, a former Swiss civil servant and historian, in his research paper entitled “Hizb ut-Tahrir-The Next al-Qaeda, Really?” cites a number of examples[85]:

"On 8 September 2003 the Russian news agency Rosbalt published an article, “Hizb ut-Tahrir to replace Al-Qaida?” Views very critical of the international Muslim political party Hizb ut-Tahrir... have been expressed for some time in the former Soviet Union. There have also been several attempts to link it... to violent actions, such as the March and July 2004 events in Uzbekistan, although initial allegations in that case were received with scepticism by most observers and the group itself firmly rejected them.

In the West too, since 2003, there have been a number of articles suggesting that Hizb ut-Tahrir might present a serious threat... a frequently quoted report published in late May 2003 by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank based in Washington, DC... the author, Ariel Cohen, a research fellow... describes Hizb ut-Tahrir as a clandestine, totalitarian organization... Cohen emphasizes – conveniently forgetting to mention that disclosure of membership is a sure way to jail in some Central Asian countries, and that Hizb ut-Tahrir organizes public meetings and is easily accessible by media in those parts of the world where it can operate freely. While the organization tends to be somewhat secretive, it is certainly not clandestine in such places[86].

In February 2004, the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think-tank, organized a closed conference on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Ankara, Turkey. While there was a general agreement among participants that Hizb ut-Tahrir ‘as a group has never been involved in terrorist activities’, some suggested that it acted as ‘a “conveyor belt” for producing terrorists’[87].

In June 2003, a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG)[88] provided a detailed analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asian. According to the authors, ‘[t]he evidence suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir is far from presenting a present-day threat to the stability of the Central Asian states in any direct senses. There is no evidence that it has any military capabilities, only limited evidence that it would even contemplate a call to arms under present conditions …’"

This increasing attention given to the potential threat of HT’s radical call, even led to Tony Blair announcing on Friday 5 August 2005 that he planned to proscribe HT, a solely political organisation with a history of non-violence spanning more than fifty years. With no political party ever being banned in modern Britain, and even the notorious Sinn Fein being permitted to operate despite links with the IRA, this created significant waves and opposition in the UK. This has led the establishment in general, and security services in particular, to seek political actors in an attempt to combat their ideas. This trend is also reflected in the Middle East, with Saudi and Egyptian regimes funding programmes to combat Islamist thought as per the recommendations of pretty much all Western think tanks and policy advisors. Egypt has had some success with figures that have been "detoxed" in Egyptian prisons, including the highly publicised example of Dr Fadl of Gemaa Islamiyya; as such this raises serious questions about the motives of the author, especially when considering his friend Ed Hussain's revealing comment on the Guardian Commentisfree site: "In Sayyid Qutb's prison, Maajid studied with traditional Muslim scholars who had abandoned the jihadist cause. His own intelligence, combined with greater study of Islam, led Maajid to question the intellectual and scriptural premise on which the entire Islamist project is based". Was this meeting of intellectuals in an Egyptian prison a coincidence? The current political climate is proving difficult for many who joined Islamic movements as a fad, forcefully arguing their case for change over many years, and then leaving to combat the movements they worked for. All this without any serious idea of the ideogy of whom they joined nor any serious idea of the ideology they adopted when they left.

Maajid’s resignation of HT following his return from Egypt came as a surprise. It is unusual why he would remain committed to HT on his return, working with it as normal, if he changed his ideas whilst in prison as he claims. Stranger still that he did not raise or escalate his concerns, doubts and findings within HT - something every member is obliged to do having sworn an oath on becoming a member. Notwithstanding this, his recent public posture in combating HT, his announcement of a series of rebuttal articles, his close relationship with the media, his self-professed difficult situation in the Egyptian prison[89] (including 3 months isolation and his subsequent illumination), his early (unconditional) release, his collaboration with and contributions to Ed Hussain's book, the roundly condemned “The Islamist”, his subversive activities on return to the UK[90] and regular references to Egyptian“ullema” and other government aligned scholars, are indicative his new direction appears to have began under the Egyptian regime's pressure during his period of incarceration. When one is isolated and unsupported, especially by the group of which one is a member, facing serious charges by an unsympathetic and tyrannical regime, one is vulnerable, open to advances and suggestions one would normally not entertain. It is a recognized phenomenon in prisoners and these situations are easily taken advantage of. In Maajid’s case his only permitted helpers comprised the UK government (represented by its Cairo consulate), his local MP, Amnesty International (who adopted him as a prisoner of conscience), his London Solicitors and the national and local media during this period[91]. The forming of such a collective group appearing more than just coincidental.

Maajid Nawaz, and more specifically, Ed Hussein and Shiraz Maher, have been courted by the political, intelligence and media hierarchy in Britain[94]. After Maajid and his colleagues were released and deported back to the UK, they were greeted at Heathrow airport by Special Branch officers who interviewed them for around three hours. There they had a DNA sample taken, were fingerprinted and asked about their political beliefs. Maajid claimed that the officers suggested he offer them his services[95]. Making such an offer appears unusual for such an experienced organisation, unless one recalls that the British Consulate in Egypt tracked Maajid's progress throughout the trial period and beyond an exchange of intelligence was probably a prelude to such an offer. Such an approach may also have been an attempt to verify the effect of the Egyptian prison reform programme on Maajid Unlike his friend Ed Hussain, who has openly said he is willing to cooperate with intelligence services[96], Maajid is more discreet about his response to them. However his close relationship with Ed Hussain and articulation of ideas bear a remarkable similarity[97].

There is also a strong commonality in Maajid Nawaz, Ed Hussain and Shiraz Maher’s attempts at combating HT, from a call to oppose “Islamists” from hijacking Islam for their narrow political goals, a return to an authentic brand of Islam, supporting Israel (repeating anti-semitic allegations) and attempting to protray HT via a receptive media as a “conveyor belt for terrorism” – reflecting Zeyno Baran’s phrase of the conservative Nixon Centre. Most of these arguments have been summarily discounted by Jean-Francois in his research paper entitled “Hizb ut-Tahrir—The Next al-Qaeda, Really?” and by the only established research on HT by Exeter university academic Suha Taji Farouki[92]. On BBC’s Newsnight on 11/09/2007, Maajid’s attempt at highlighting a connection between HT activities and violence comprised one single example, from his twelve years of activism, of the killing of the Nigerian, Ayotunde Obunabi, at Newham College in 1995 (from which both he and Ed Hussain, who interestingly cited the same example, are eager to distance themselves from all personal responsibility). This incident is widely acknowledged as having no connection to HT, or its call, being rather an alleged drugs related incident[93].

However Maajid's intended objective which he touches on in his introduction, “Islam needs... a counter-reformation and a return to its true essence by Muslims insisting that their religion is not used merely to serve narrow political agendas”, is indicative that he has become a pawn in the newly emerging political landscape. This is also a consistent theme that appears in the comment section of his moderated blog judging by the small number of comments that have been approved [98]. He is currently coy about what he views as the true essence of Islam, but his friend Ed Hussain believes it to be a secular spiritual form of Islam with no political content, speaking in the New Statesman in June 2007, “Islam, with its history of plurality and spirituality, has a natural home in Britain. Islamism, a political ideology set up to confront the West, does not”. Throwing caution to the winds, he goes on to say, “...former Islamists can demolish the psychological confidence of extremists” and “Just as we don't talk to the BNP to understand white, working-class grievances, we need not engage with Islamists to comprehend Muslim suffering”[99]. These comments resonate with his Newsnight interview where he confirmed his intention of trying to “convert” as many members of HT as possible.

“Religions are not for governments or states, they are for individuals. The state can assist individuals religious responsibilities, but governments cannot, should not, profess faith”, (Ed Hussain, The Islamist)

14. Conclusion

Maajid Nawaz was unknown before rising to fame as a British member of HT having been arrested in Egypt in 2002 along with two others. He was reported to the Egyptian security services for his indiscreet political comments whilst studying at a university there as part of his SOAS course. Despite his incarceration being seen by some as a sacrifice, it is something inevitable for the naive individual who ill-considers the tight security situation in most Muslim countries and "rushes in where angels fear to tread" - his treatment was insignificant compared to others have not had the benefit of a British passport.

Maajid's self-confessed knowledge of Islam, like that of his predecessors Ed Hussain and Shiraz Maher, is based on some limited HT teachings and general readings - absence of any serious study of the Islamic sciences prior to or during their encounters with HT is woefully lacking. This leaves them susceptible to those government scholars, manipulating Islam and presenting it as "authentic" to fool them into believing any non-Islamic ideology is Islamic - Maher for example states in his TimesOnline article that he believes Islam is compatible with secularism despite the fact that Mohammed (pbuh) was a religious political ruler of a religiously structured expansionist state as were his followers. Maajid's route however led him to attempt to teach himself the Islamic sciences by reading material he claims he found whilst in an Egyprian prison, a questionable academic institute, its influence on many historical political figures Maajid reviles. His apparent journey to enlightenment has the hollow sort of ring reminiscent of the "spin" that would appear on the business plan of a dot com in the late nineties.

Thus his article, "Evaluating Hizb ut-Tahrir's Theo-political Stance" contains a significant number of elementary mistakes, the research is selective, sources are misquoted and misportrayed, principles are misapplied and there is no referencing (with only secondary sources) on a number of important citations[100]. Though the piece is presented in an "academic" style, it reads more as an undergraduate’s defence of the current despotic Middle Eastern regimes aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Muslim world, and maybe would have been more appropriately titled as such[101]. The gist of his argument is that HT is Islamist and Islamists are not following Islam but a political ideology - which ideology, he fails to name. He believes "his religion" does not entertain Islamists - the supporting reasoning lacking somewhat. He acknowledges HT have an Islamic ijtihad which would make them Islamic by all counts - however, due to difference of opinion on the definition of a land HT should not be trying to remove the rulers. Through misquotation, dubious interpretations and unusual application of principles, he fails to demonstrate what he started out to do. It is not inconceivable that anyone including Maajid can show an error in HT methodology - however he has yet to show that he has identified any such error. His article in fact supports HT's assertion that it is an organisation that extracts its views from the Islamic sources, wishes to bring about the classically understood Islamic form of governance, the Caliphate, and undertake political and intellectual reformation of the Muslim world.

Although style is not a major consideration, utilization of an academic style implies the article is well researched, critical and neutral. Most of these criteria are not met by the article. This is no doubt due to the fact that Maajid’s academic background is lacking, having only in recent months been awarded his undergraduate degree after ten years of commencing it; no doubt his youthful diary was full of activities with little time devoted to study or development of intellectual and critical thinking.

Many activists when engaging with groups fail to undertake research, read or develop beyond the basic culture they are provided with, despite being strongly encouraged to do so[102]. They are therefore surprised and often disorientated when they discover the Islamic cultural heritage for the first time, shaken by its depth, breadth and sophistication of thought. Maajid appears to have been a victim of the same problem, as he mentions in his Newsnight interview[103], his enlightenment occurring having read some classical Islamic texts in prison[104], (or so he claims[105]). However he fails to have recognised the limitations of the self-taught, especially those who develop delusions of grandeur and high self worth – in Maajid’s case this is seen in his miscitations of the books he read (or more probably lifted uncritically from other works), misinterpreting Sharia principles and classical texts and disputing decisive concepts.

Maajid expects the reader to believe that his lone experience with HT and its Islamist ideas are enough to make him an authority on the subject of Islamism. He attacks Islamism absolutely giving no consideration to the contribution made by successive generations of jurists, sufis, thinkers and writers in movements ranging from Morocco to Indonesia. In particular, he has failed to recognise HT and its contribution to this organic process – the creation of a political party built solely on Islam, embodying five decades of distillation and contemporisation of the strongest ideas from fourteen centuries of Islamic civilisation and scholarship to engage with the problems of modernity – a challenge the Muslim world is attempting to collectively resolve.

The thrust of Maajid’s endeavours advocate a secularised Islamic theology - however, he does not appear to have any conviction in his ideas, failing to establish any organisation to propagate them, instead, focusing on an agenda of attacking Islamists and impeding their work. His manner is remarkably similar to that of his friend, Ed Hussain, tarnished as an establishment figure and attention seeker, labelled by some as an agent. Maajid’s close association with Ed and the proximity of ideas has left a similar indelible mark in relation to his writings and views – his TimesOnline article reading very much like Ed Hussain’s, “The Islamist”. Ed's ideas are weak and insignificant - Maajid's role appears to be provision of substance for them, in collaboration with a team of sub-editors, who apparently write and publish much of his content.

The emergence of a new cadre of political actors, willing to work with the establishment to openly and intellectually counter efforts of those working to establish the Islamic Caliphate, is a new dimension to the UK political scene. Their value as political actors is not in their expertise of Islamism, offering only limited ethnographic accounts of their experiences, but in their contribution to stifle the formidable rise of political Islam.

History is said to repeat itself - those guilty of treason in the historic demise of the Ottoman Caliphate by working to further the interests of foreign powers, like the Egyptian Mohammed Ali, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, Sharif Hussain and Abdul Aziz bin Saud walked a path not unlike that of their less significant modern day counterparts Hamid Karzai, Mahmood Abbas, Nuri al-Maliki, Musharraf, Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher, Hassan Butt and most recently, Maajid Nawaz[106].

Maajid states the flaw he has found is "astoundingly obvious" for any trained practioner of the Sharia[107], apparently missed by generations of thinkers, activists, critics and jurists, commenting, “no one fully understanding what it is that Ĥizb ut-Taĥrīr actually believe”. However, there is a significant flaw in his return journey from Islamism to secularism – the attempted application of classical Islamic juristic texts relating to discussions and problems of a different milieu to a postmodern nihilistic world, which embodies an accumulation of experiences of enlightenment, modernity, ideological turbulence and civilizational conflict. One would have expected him to have done further research to ensure that maybe he had not misunderstood something "astoundingly obvious" before publicizing his embryonic views.

However, for the new cadre working against those advocating political reformation and change in the Muslim world, maybe this is not an important consideration...

"As for those who sell for a small price the covenant and faith they owe to Allah and their own plighted word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter. Nor will Allah speak to them or look at them on the Day of Judgment, nor will He cleanse them: They shall have a grievous torment, a painful doom." [Quran 3:77]

[1] "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda", http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf, reviewed 09/09/2007

[2] Including Hasan al-Banna, Mawdudi, Syed Qutb, Khomeini and al-Nabhani

[3] "The Government’s Approach", http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/12-05-sp-terrorism-bill, reviewed 10/09/2007

[4] Notable examples including Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and members of al-Muhajiroon amongst others

[5] "Blair launches fund to improve teaching of Islam", http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,,2094977,00.html, reviewed 05/09/2007

[6] "Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism", http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 12/09/2007

[7] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 01/09/2007

[8] From pg.5 of his article

[9] From pg.5 of his article

[10] Op. Cit. http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf

[11] Christian missionary movements also participated creating Catholic and Protestant colleges in the Levant including the American University in Beirut, St Joseph’s College in Lebanon. Roberts College in Turkey and Forman Christian College in Lahore.

[12] Marxist Fidaiyan-i Khalf of Iran, Parcham and Khalf parties in Afghanistan, Communist activists in Yemen and Turkey and guerrilla factions in Malaysia

[13] The British even had the Himalayan Gurkha soldiers continue to fight for them as recently as the Falkland War in 1982.

[14] However new legislation in 1998 curtailed much of its powers and autonomy

[15] The current American occupation of Iraq reflects this

[16] Ferguson, Niall, "Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World", Penguin Books Ltd, 2004

[17] Cleveland, W, "A History of the Modern Middle East", Westview Press, 2004,

Esposito, J, "The Oxford History of Islam", Oxford University Press, 1999,

Hitti, P, "History of the Arabs", Macmillan, 1970,

Hourrani, A, "History of the Arab Peoples", Grand Central Publishing Ltd, 1992,

Lewis, B, "A history of the Middle East", Scribner, 1997,

Roberts, J, M, "The New Penguin History of the World", Penguin Books, 2004,

[18] Including but not limited to: Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (India 1786-1831), Mirza Hasan Shirazi (Iran 1815-94), Imam Shamil (Central Asia, 1796-1871), Amir Abd al-Qadir (Algeria, 1808-83), Mohammed ibn Abdille Hasan (Somaliland 1864-1920), Mahdi (Sudan, 1885), Uthman Dan Fodo (Nigeria, 1754-1817), Mohammed Iqbal (Pakistan, 1877-1938), Abul-Kalam Azad (India, 1888-1958), Mawlana Husain Madani (India, 1879-1957) and Mawdudi (Pakistan, 1903-79)

[19] In which issues of knowledge, truth and certainty are discussed

[20] Presented by the founder father of Rationalism, Renes Descartes, in his Meditations, resonating a similar discussion of al-Ghazali in his autobiography, Munqid Min al-Dalal, an argument which Ghazali rejects

[21] Quran 102:5, 102:7 and 69:51

[22] This is supported by narrations from the Sunnah, for example, "O God, apportion to us such...certainty (of faith) that the calamities of this world will be made easy for us by Thee" Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 783

[23] Elaborated in the book, "Shaksiyyah Islamiyyah (The Islamic Personality)"

[24] Quran 5:38

[25] "The twisting of ahadith to justify the abandonment of the Shariah", http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/twisting-of-ahadith-to-justify.html, reviewed 10/09/07

[26] Violated on occasions by some jurists historically like Ibn Hazm or Ibn Taymiyyah, who took more decisive approaches to matters

[27] Quran 12:40

[28] Quran 5:60

[29] Quran 5:44

[30] Quran 5: 49

[31] Quran 5:141

[32] Ibn al-Qayyim, "Madaarij as-Saaliheen", 1/336-337

[33] Sharh At-tahaaweeyyah,pg.324

[34] Minhaj as-Sunnah, 5/pp.130-132

[35] Ibn Kathir, "Tafseerul Quran ul Atheeem"

[36] Al-Shawkani, "Ar-Rasaa'il as-Salafiyah", pp.33-34

[38] Sovereignty for Allah being the popular phrase

[39] al-Nabhani "Party Structure", al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 1

[40] The adoption of the book "Hamla Dawah tul-Islam wajibat wa sifaat (The way to carry the call – its obligations & characteristics)" by HT in 2001 was one that some of its members had problems with as it constituted the introduction of a set of concepts into HT rather than being simply the expression of personal thoughts of an individual – it was subsequently removed from the adopted list of books

[41] Adoption in Hizb ut-Tahrir, pp. 1-2 – it is published on the HT official website cited above

[42] Note 19

[43] Pg. 7 of his article

[44] The Islamic laws relating to Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr/Harb (referring to lands where Islam ruled and non-Islamic lands respectively) are detailed in these famous texts, written by jurists from across all the main schools of thought: Mughni, Kishaf Alqina An Matn Al-Iqna, Sharh Muntahi Al-Iradat, Insaaf, Al-Furu, Al-Iqna, Alsharh Al-Kabir, Al-Hashiya Al-Jamal, Nihayat Al-Muhtaj, Thufat Al-Muhta, Sharh Albahja, Al-Majmoo, Hawahshi Al-Sharawani, Iaana Al-Talibeen, Al-Umm, Radd Al-Muhtaar, Al-Bahr Al-Raiq, Fath Al-Qadir, Al-Jawhara Al-Neera, Badai Al-Sanaai, Al-Mabsoot, Tuhfa Al-Fuqaha

[45] See section 9 for a detailed discussion of terms and definitions

[46] Examples including Dar al-Amn (Abode of Security), Dar al-Silm (Abode of Peace), Dar al-Muwada’ah (Abode of Mmutual Peace), Dar Al-‘Ahd (Abode of Covenant), Dar Al-Sulh (Abode of Truce), Dar Al-Maslubah (Abode of Pillaged Land), Dar Al-Bid’ah (Abode of Heresy), Dar Al-‘Adl (Abode of Justice), Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Unbelief) etc.

[47] The most pervasive mention of the terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb are to be found in the siyar or maghazi literature or under the section of jihad in fiqh books (where jurists classified the wider rules of international relations, including rules regarding treaties, ceasefire, asylum and international trade).

[48] The Dar Paradigm and Identity, http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/dar-paradigm-and-identity.html, reviewed 08/09/07

[49] Tariq Ramadan states: ‘The concepts of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-harb, and Dar al-‘ahd were not described in the Qur’an or in the Sunna. In fact they constituted a human attempt, at a moment in history, to describe the world and to provide the Muslim community with a geopolitical scheme that appropriate to the reality of the time. This reality has completely changed’, Ramadan, T, "Western Muslims and the Future of Islam", Oxford University Press, 2004, pg.69.

[50] Additionally, the following texts amongst others have been cited in this discussion:

“Those who do not govern with what Allah has revealed, they are the disbelievers” [Al-Maida:44]

“Allah will not allow the disbelievers to have an authority over the believers” [An-Nisa:141]

Junada b. abi Umayyah who said: "...the Messenger of Allah (saw) called upon us and we gave him the Bai’ah, ...and that we should not dispute the authority of its people unless we saw open Kufr upon which we had a proof from Allah" (Al-Bukhari). Anas narrated that: “Wherever the Prophet (saw) raided some people he would not raid except in the morning. If he heard the Adhan he would refrain, and if he did not he would invade after dawn”.

And it was narrated by Essam Almusny, who said: “The Prophet (saw) used to tell to the expeditions that he sent: ‘If you` have seen a mosque or heard a call for prayer, then do not kill anybody.’”

Once Abdul Rahman bin ‘Awf was speaking with Caliph Umar (ra), he said, “Do not be harsh on them (speaking about some of the Hujaaj) until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.” [Sahih Bukhari Hadith no. 3713]

Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, “The Prophet (saw), Abu Bakr and Umar (ra) where from the Muhajireen because they migrated from the Mushrikeen. Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar ul-Shirk and they came to the Prophet(saw) on the night of the Bay’ah al-Aqabah.” [an-Nisa’i]

[51] Ibid. cited from Sahih Muslim, Hadith no. 4294

[52] Quran 8:61

[53] Hence the usage of terms unipolar, bipolar or statist paradigms

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibn Qayyim, "Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah", Vol. 1, p.366

[56] “Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change” is the revised name of the same book

[57] Ali bin Mohammed al-Sharif Al-Jurjani defines it in a similar manner in his “Kitab al-Tarifat”, 1969, Maktaba Lubnaan, Arabic Edition, pg. 64, namely that “a definition is a statement expressing an understanding in terms of another thing”

[58] These definitions are generally required to adhere to basic rules to ensure they are meaningful and useful . Traditionally the following conditions have been imposed:

1. A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined.

2. Definitions should avoid circularity.

3. The definition must not be too wide or too narrow (jami/mani). It must be applicable to everything to which the defined term applies and to no other objects.

4. The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are commonly understood and whose meaning is clear.

5. A definition should not be negative where it can be positive.

(http://www.reference.com/search?q=definition, reviewed 08/09/2007)

[59] al-Jurjani op. cit. pg. 181

[60] "Mujizat al-Quran"; Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti has a similar understanding in his "al-Itiqan fi 'ulum al-Qur’an", (2 vol. Cairo, 1951/1370)

[61] Sayf al-Deen al-Aamidi, "Al-Ihkaam", 1/28 and "Rawdat al-Nathir" by Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi 1/178

[62] Al-`Inayah published on the margins of Fath al-Qadeer (2/142) and Hashiyat Ibn `Abideen (2/268)

[63] Zayla'i, "Tabyeen al-Haqa’iq", (1/247). See also Al-Bahr al-Ra’iq (2/211)]

[64] Dardeer, "Al-Sharh al-Kabeer", (1/425)

[65] Mughni al-Muhtaj (1/350) and Fath al-Bari (6/129)

[66] Fath al-Bari (6/43)

[67] Kash-shaf al-Qina`, 2/113 and Al-Mughni (2/206)

[68] Abu Hanifa being an example

[69] Pg. 7 of his article

[70] Maajid seems to be emulating his colleague Ed Hussain... “Hussain has said that he does not accept the concept of the Caliphate or an Islamic State. He misrepresented Shaykh Hamza Yusuf by alleging that he said that there was "no such thing as an Islamic state". When questioned on DeenPort as to whether the Caliphate was fard kifayah, as discussed by the classical scholars, Husain says that he does not discuss in terms of fard ain or fard kifayah. Husain writes that the Islamic state "is not a rukn of the deen and without it the deen is not lost. An individual can remain a firm believer, a mutadayyin, without the imam and the jama'ah." However, the classical scholar, Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud bin Umar al-Taftazani, wrote, "There is consensus that appointing a Caliph is obligatory. The difference of opinion is on whether the appointment must be by Allah or by his servants, and whether the basis (for appointment) is textual evidence or rational proof. The adoption is that it is obligatory upon the servants by textual evidence because of the saying of the Messenger, “Whoever dies not having known the Imam of his time, dies the death of the days of ignorance.”” http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?t=22827&page=2

[71] al-Shawkani, "Nayl al-Awtar", Vol 4, Book 8, Dar al-Fikr, 2000, pg. 24

[72] Ibn Qayyim, "Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah", Vol. 1, p.366

[73] Maajid omits aspects of HT’s quote – the full quote is presented here with the omissions, reflecting how closely aligned HT’s position is with the classic scholars

[74] Pp. 9-12 of his article

[75] "Clarifying the meaning of Dar al-Kufr & Dar al-Islam", http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/islamic-thoughts/islamic-thoughts/clarifying-the-meaning-of-dar-al-kufr--dar-al-islam.html, reviewed 13/09/07

[76] al-Nabhani, T, "Shaksiyyah Islamiyya", Volume 2, pg. 249

[77] al-Mu’atamad fil Usul ad-Deen, pg. 276

[78] al-Sayl Jaraar, Vol. 1, pg. 576

[79] Qutb, S, "In the Shade of the Qur’an", Vol. 2 pg. 874

[80] Ibid., pp. 191-194

[81] Ibid. pp. 196-197

[82] Ibid. pp. 197-199

[83] al-Nabhani, T, "Structuring of a Party", (Attakattul el-Hizbi, tr. From 4th edition), 2001, Al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 6

[84] "Oh! What a Lovely War on Terror - it's the number the arms dealers love", http://politics.guardian.co.uk/columnist/story/0,,2168993,00.html, reviewed 14/09/2007

[85] "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The Next al-Qaeda, Really?", http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf, reviewed 14/09/2007

[86] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf

[87] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf

[88] "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir. ICG Asia", International Crisis Group (ICG), Report, No. 58, 30 June 2003. The report is available from the ICG website: http://www.crisisweb.org.

[89] Made none the easier by HT publicising his and his co-defendants plight internationally to highlight the tyrannical Egyptian dictatorship, or the hostile reception received by Mubarak's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Maher, by a HT incited demonstration in Jerusalem to name but two incidents

[90] Attending public appearances and advocating HT ideas at events organized by HT whilst collaborating with those who had left the party, secretly attending meetings and discussions and other such subversive and clandestine activities

[91] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021105/debtext/21105-37.htm

[92] Taji-Farouki, S, "A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate", Grey Seal, 1996

[93] Maajid Nawaz's brother, the Islam Channel presenter, Kaashif Nawaz, disputes the account, saying "The murder at East Ham college was not of a man who was Christian, but of a man who was high on drugs, and carrying 2 knives with intent on attacking one of the students on campus, he was intercepted by a gang of Muslims, who intercepted him - nothing to do with Islamism or HT, but more do with gang wars which Muslims got involved in and HT members tried to resolve." Regardless of the causes nothing has been proven to be related to HT in this instance or any other instance despite the party operating across the UK for nearly two decades. Both Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz both attempt to make this tenuous connection by citing HT created an atmosphere that led to this incident - this is akin to stating the UK government is at fault for issuing a British passport that permitted entry to a foreign land, resulting in attrocities being caused

[94] "Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism", http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 14/09/2007

[95] "Who’s Listening to Whom?", http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2006/03/14/kurt_met_police_trust_feature.shtml, reviewed 14/09/07.

[96] In his interview with the New York Times, 02 June 2007, Hussain explained that he had been approached by British government officials to join their "anti-extremist efforts". In an interview with Sky's Adam Boulton, Hussain did not deny Boulton's suggestion that he has been called in by "Gordon Brown or government". His comments in the Guardian however indicate where his loyalties lie: "...More than ever, we have a duty to define Britishness and teach children and newcomers how Britain developed democracy, tolerance, plurality, and why these are cherished, non-negotiable values", http://www.guardian.co.uk/britain/article/0,,2099556,00.html

[97] In an interview with altmuslim.com published on 03 June 2007, Hussain says, "In this, I'm backed by Maajid Nawaz who, alhamdulillah, recently left Hizb-ut-Tahrir partly as a result of conversations we had about these issues, and more importantly, his exposure to traditional Islam in all its diversity. Soon, Maajid will speak publicly and I ask Hizb members and others to listen and learn from Maajid's wisdom, knowledge, and experience.”

[98] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, A section that is allegedly subject to rigorous editorial control with many comments not being posted or heavily edited to suit before being presented - a number of sites and fronts by his colleagues/sub-editors have been set up with similar views albeit crudely expressed, including: http://www.tftd.ws/ , http://www.jargonistic.com/ and http://rashadzamanali.blogspot.com/2007/09/rashad-zaman-ali-khilafah-is.html

[99] "New Statesmen", 14 June 2007

[100] For instance the quote "opposing views are based on Kufr" is incorrectly attributed to HT who are amongst the most liberal thinking when it comes to entertaining alternative views

[101] As such, a host of comments have been made on various internet sites - blogs have even appeared satirizing the immature and naïve stance Maajid and his cadre has taken, examples including:

http://edhusain.blogspot.com/2007/09/message-from-hosni-mubarak-to-ed-husain.html,

http://www.maajidnawaaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 19/09/2007

[102] Ed Hussain's book, "The Islamist", (to which Maajid contributed) reflects this problem with the frequent jumps from one position to the other.

[103] "BBC Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman", http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl?scope=all&edition=d&tab=all&recipe=all&q=maajid+nawaz, reviewed 11/09/2007

[104] "Why I joined the British jihad - and why I rejected it", http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2459969.ece, reviewed 16/09/2007

[105] "Leading militant in split with Islamists", http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,,2165546,00.html, reviewed 12/09/2007

[106] Maajid's arguments resemble those of Abd al-Raziq, a senior member of al-Azhar University, who in 1925 responded with "Islam and the Bases of Government". In it he argued that Islam did not lay down any particular political system, nor did Islam have anything to do with the Caliphate as the Muslims understood it. He furthermore said that the rules that the Prophet (pbuh) laid down only related to such things as prayer and fasting, rules appropriate only for people in a simple state with a natural government. He was expelled from al-Azhar for such heretical views, his books were condemned by religious circles and he was dismissed from his post as a religious judge. Rosenthall commented on him saying: "we meet for the first time a consistent, unequivocal theoretical assertion of the purely and exclusively religious character of Islam". Black, A, "The history of Islamic Political Thought", Edinburgh University Press, 2001, pp. 316-319.

[107] Something he considers to be given his stint in prison where he "taught himself" Sharia and his Arabic/Law studies at the British establishment SOAS